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Abstract
Environmentalists r citizens groupsr legal practitioners r
academics and the ordinary citizens in South Africa today are
over-excited with the prospects of the environmental rights
litigation under the final Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa r Act 108 of 1996 signed by the State President in Cape
Town on the 18th December 1996. For the first time in the history
of South Africa environmental rights have been lifted to the
status of fundamental constitutional and human rights. From an
environmental perspective r the upliftment of environmental rights
to the level of constitutional protection is a great achievement
that will benefit all South Africans. This dissertation throws
some light on the concept of locus standi and public interest
litigation as they have developed In the New South African
Constitution r followed by an exposition of the common law rules
of legal standing. The focus of attention will then turn to the
extent to which the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Act 200 of 1993 and the final Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa Act r 1996 extend or broaden the scope of
standing r followed by a brief survey of legal standing of
environmental associations in various countries. FinallYr the
document will conclude with a brief commentary on the law of
standing in South Africa and possible suggestions for reform.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decades environmentalists have seen the legal concept
of locus standi as a barrier to taking environmental problems to
the courts. Calls for the liberalisation of locus standi to
promote the public interest in environmental matters intensified
as years went by. The New Constitution of the Republic of South
l" --~"- " " ' - -" '-
Africa Act 108 of 1996 assented to by the State president on the
18th December 1996 has opened many avenues for the widening of
~fhe - - Iocus standi requirement. In my view, the incorporation of
., . N"·- ·-,·-"' ··-·-· --- -..· -· ,"' ~"~··r " , ,_ ','.' _, _' , _", ._. _
the environmental right in the Constitution coupled with the
broadening of the locus standi requirement promise interesting
changes from an environmental law perspective and therefore,
creates an awareness of and sensitivity towards the environmerit.
For many years the exact content of the locus standi phenomenon
has been baffling academics and judges. As a result, many good
cases have failed because the party approaching the court could
not prove that he or she has a 'legally enforceable right' or so-
called 'sufficient interest' in the case. 1 Traditionally (under
common law), a litigant is required to show a direct and
substantial interest in the right which is the subject matter of
the litigation and in the outcome of the litigation and not
merely a financial interest which is only an indirect interest
in such litigation. 2
There is no doubt that the obvious effect of locus standi rules
in any legal system is to exclude some people from obtaining the
assistance of the courts in declaring and enforcing the law in
circumstances where others could obtain that assistance. This is
also typical of our common law. As a result, wherever someone is
thus excluded by reason of locus standi rules, the law regards
1 Elmene Bray, 'The Libera tion Of Locus Standi in the
Interim Constitution: An Environmental Angle' THRHR (1994) 57 at
481.
2 L Baxter, Administrative Law, 1984, 650 ff.
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it as preferable that an illegality should continue than that the
person e xcluded should have access to the courts.
Schiemann's view is that the locus s tandi rules are only one of
several techniques of exclusion used by the law which can have
the effect of permitting the illegality to continue. 3 In the
context of environmental law it was common to find a permanent
exclusion that for the litigant to succeed, he or she has to
prove that he or she has suffered damage or has a direct and
substantial interest in the case. By contrast, in the context of
administrative law, it is common to find a temporal exclusion
that, however closely affected y ou are, you must allege within
a given time, or a requirement that other remedies should first
be exhaus t ed . "
Legal systems, for all their very real diversity, are often faced
with similar problems. How they react to those problems will of
course depend on the needs of a particular country. This paper
will be concerned with one such problem, to-a_t=Qf~s-tandi.ng_and
publ i c j~-€B.t.-.litiga.t..i.Qn_as--the..y_have dev~lQp-e_d_the_S-9_1JJ~h
~frican constitution. ~tanding is a controveraia~sub~_L-Qo~
9nl~ in. ~nvironmental_lawbut also in admin_i.~t~tiY~a~. As such
an exposition of the case law will have to be followed by some
~~-,~l,JJ&Lt_iQn anLc-rit i c i SID_ d.eJLLgrred t 0 higb.li.gJJ...t~t.h~-11nde r l y:i n.g
issues with a view to determine the future course which the law
might take.
In the past two decades we have witnessed an increased pressure
that has been placed upon the courts to alter their traditional
posture. This was evidenced by those interests e. g, environmental
concerns, which could not easily be accommodated by the
individualized concepts of private rights starting to acquire
increased value. This kind of achievement could be attributed to
3
4
Si r Konrad Schiemann 'Locus Standi' 1990 Public Law 342.
Schiemann op cit at 342.
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the great job done by environmentalists and othersS who
generated a vast quantity of literature attacking the narrow
conception of standing adopted by the courts while demanding that
interests wider than those encapsulated by the i nd i v i du a l i s t
notions of property and liberty should be admitted in order to
assess the right of bona fide litigants to standing. 6
Of late, it appears that international law developments ,
particularly in the field of environmental and human rights, and
the examples set by many countries' constitutions, especially
India, played a major role in building up our environmental law
legislation aimed at protecting the environment. This 1S
evidenced by the inclusion of environmental protection provisions
in a new South African constitutional st ructure. 7
5 These include Peter Glavovic, Jan Glazewski, Cheryl
Loots, Andre Rabie, and many others.
6 See L Baxter, Administrative Law (1984) 64 5 -6 .
7 See generally Glazewski 'The Environment, Human Rights
and a New South African Consti tution' (1991) 7 SAJHR 167 176-180.
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2. THE COMMON LAW
2.1 The nature of locus standi
It is n o t easy to track down the meaning of the e xpr ess ion ~ l ocus
standi in judicio' in the Corpus Iuris Civilis or other Roman
writings despite the fact that it is employed fai rly r e gu l a r l y .
The term is difficult to define as it has been used to ref e r to
different factors that affect a party's right to claim relief
from a civil court. However, Huber in his writings speaks of it
as fo llows: 8
~In the case of both plaintiff and defendant, it is necessary
that they should have a locus standi in judici o, that is, a
capacity to appear before the law, such as is not possessed
by all those who are not their own men, like children under
seven y e a r s , and insane persons, wh o cannot appear any way,
even when supported by their tutor'
From Huber's writings one learns that the term is used to refer
to the legal capacity of a person to appear in court and
therefore, applies to all the parties to an action, not only the
party claiming to enforce his or her right. 9 Standing becomes an
issue when, having established that a legally enforceable right
exists , the court asks at whose instance the r i g h t l S
erifo'rceabLe c "
~The locus standi requirement has always prevented a party who
wanted to bring an action in the public interest. In claiming the




Hedendaegse Rechtsgeleerdheyt 4.15.39 (As translated by
See P R Q Boberg ~ The Law of Persons and the Family' 1977
1 0 Cheryl Loots ~Locus Standi to Claim Relief in
Enforcement of Legislation' SALJ at 1 32 .
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the public at large or a segment of the public. The main
intention that she or he has is to vindicate or protect the
publ~c interest, not his or her own interest, although she or he
may incidentally achieve that end as well. 11 The courts have
used the term locus standi to refer to a plaintiff I s or an
applicant's right to claim the relief which he seeks.~ln_~b~s
s ense a 121a int ill..-Q.1:~ app1 i cauL-w-Ou-l..d-he_sai.LLo-l..a.c-k_LQ...cue
~.adi-i.f_his_clai.m_was-nGt.-based_on_.a-.le.gal_ri.ght-.e.nJorceahl e
by him. 1 2
2.2 The General Rule
Traditionally, standing has been regarded as a preliminary or
threshold issue that determines the right to sue such that it had
to be dealt with in limine before the merits of the case are
considered. The locus standi o f an-appl i cant_may-h~__qlle~~~ned
W.-t...he res};;2ondent...or tJ:H=_ cour.t ._and__.t .he .- a pp.l L GgJJ.t -h9,J;2 a ..£L1d1Y-....bQ
~o..Y-.e_tha.t.-.he.......has-lo_Gu..;L..s_tan~J.:h~R±:~s.§..J",..y_Qr im121 i ci.J.:_ly.
through the fact.s presented by- him. ' ']"h~p.r.e.dQmin.9J),.t__f a.c_t .o.r-i.n- a m T'\ v=- """'-'-1
;Ls.au~.-r..e.g..arding locus [3 t an di j s that in orde.L-.Lo ha~_t-a.n.d.in.g
to .g,h a l l e n g e Cl.clm.i.n i.s. tr a tj.v e....-.unl.a.W£ulne.aa....an._indiyidual-ffi1.ll2t show
that he has some degree of ~sonal _. i nterest in t.he
administrative act under challenge. Thi.s_iJJ. t..ex ...e...S...L _i n di.c.a t .e.s._the
~us betw..eeD_ t.h.s;--.app__l.:L<;:: ant~?-nd_th~_me_Li..t.$.......QLthe__<;..2..s..e .
v1n_t he cont.e-Xt.-o.:Ladminis...t.ra.t.i:\Le_law a_ Lit....-ig gJJ.t .__who_seeks--.:r:edxess
tn~_ri=.s.p_e..c~t__Q_;t .un,,~1--adminJ.....s trat_iY~--.9-Q.t_ioD.. must-hay£ J ocus
8tandi or ~standing to sue' which entails the folLo~~:
(i) the necessary capacity to sue; and







~he first requirement ensures that the litigant is that person
who is properly able to represent his own rights or the rights
of the person seeking the benefits of judicial relief. It would
seem that the second requirement which requires the litigant to
have a legally-recognised interest to claim the judicial remedy
could be invoked in order to regulate access to the courts, to
ensure that the person best suited to litigate the issues raised
by the challenge is the one who appears in court, to prevent
vexatious litigation, and to ensure th~t the court is presented
with a concrete, not hypothetical dispute. 13
The general rule of our law was laid down an the case of
Dalrymple v Colonial 'rxeeeurer'" where the court held that 'No
man can sue in respect of a wrongful act unless it constitutes
the breach of a duty owed to him by the wrongdoer, or unless it
causes him some damage in law. This principle runs through the
whole of our jurisprudence. It is not confined merely to the
civil side, the rule applies to wrongful acts which affect the
public, as well as to torts committed against private
individuals I .15 The ultimate demand by the court was that the
applicant prove a 'sufficient I legally recognised interest before
the case could be adjudicated.
A more difficult question that arose was the exact meaning of
'sufficient interest I. It would appear that in order to establish
standing a litigant had to claim that (i) some legal right or
recognised interest is at stake; (ii) the right is direct;16 and
(iii) the right or interest is a personal one which means that
the complainant's interest must be personal to him. Another




See Baxter op cit at 645.
1910 TPD 372.
At 384-90.
16 See Johannesburg Ci ty Council v Administrator, Transvaal
19 6 9 ( 2 ) SA 72 (T) .
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interest must be a special interest of the complainant or must
it be an interest uniquely enjoyed by an individual or
identifiable group of individuals, an interest which is greater
than that shared by members of the public at large?
In terms of our common law individuals normally don I t have
standing to vindicate 'the public interest I, but they can
approach the court if the same action infringes a similar
personal interest of every other member of the p~blic. With f ou r
notable exceptions (to be considered later) , 17v{ he South Afr ican
<;DJ]rt S hav e.been rJ~.IJ.LcLant-,t 0 rec_ogIl_i z.e_ Lh.e-s_tandirl.g.....oLli_tig.ant..s
~a::\le_ _c.La.i,med.Lt.o__he.._suing-in-a_r...e.p.;Le..sj~.n_ta tj..Ye ca;Qa.f: i t y-9JJ.
:p-.e.h.a l f 0 f 0 t her s . 1I-adi t LQnal l-¥_, t.he-.-- r.ig.hL __ t .CL.-e.n.gag_e..._---i.n
1 i t .i .gat.iDn.....i .s._ ::ceJLt r.i c.t.e.d-_.to._-_tho s~e·:::w:hQ__c_an_he-.-S.i:li.d_..LQ......ha3Le.._Lo_cus
standi in the c i;l,\l:§e. Therefore/.-...lQ_Q1Jg-....J2.t~ndi i s_aQ_cQLde_d_:t_Q_~t_hQJ'L~
whQ .ha.\l.e~"~s_QJI\e_~--k:~_a_L-.QJ::..-imme-cli.aLe.......i.nt e re s t .Q.L.......C_O.lLC£rn~ ieP= t J;)·e
wb-ie.ct_Q.L_t he_Ji.t..i-ga,,1;;,;Lon .
A possible question that may arise is whether an environmentalist
could not be said to have suff icient interest in the preservation
of the natural environment to be able to claim locus standi. This
question arose in the case of Van Moltke v Costa Aerosa (Pty)
Ltd. 1 8 In this case the applicant, a resident of Llandudno, a
coastal suburb near Cape Town, who regularly visited Sandy Bay,
sought an interdict restricting the respondent developer from
continuing with the development of certain land above the high-
water mark on the ground that the requisite planning permission
had not been obtained under the then applicable Cape Townships
Ordinance. The applicant also alleged that certain undesirable
environmental consequences would result. The applicant further
alleged that the respondentls activities were interfering with
the ecology of the area and thus constituted a public nuisance
which he now sought to prevent by obtaining an interdict.
17
18
See Baxter op cit at 658-667.
1975 (1) SA 255 (C).
8
The court did not have to consider the latter as it decided that
the applicant lacked the required standing, holding that the
party seeking relief must show that he is suffering or will
suffer some injury, prejudice or damage or invasion of right
peculiar to himself and over and above that sustained by the
members of the public in general . It is not enough to allege that
a nuisance is being committed, he must go further and at the very
least allege facts from which it can be inferred that he has a
special reason for coming to court. 1 9
In coming to this decision the court seems to have adopted the
Anglo-American approach in regard to standing that a-membe.r~_Qf
t.he_p.ublic... _~q_ann9_L__.i n s_t.i .t l1t.e._ a__ p.+:iY:ate._~a.c_t.iQn.., _.for_ ~~a_PJJb.JJ...c
nuLs.an.c.e_unl.ess_he__oan.iahow.it.har; be haB-Sllffere.cL.BDIIlB_P.a.r.t..Lcular
qarnage distingllishab~from-that-aua~a~nad-bY- other membera-o£
the p.ubJic. Surprisingly, the court seems to have ignored the
earlier decision in Dell v Town Council of Cape Town2 0 which
holds the converse. This case involved an application for an
interdict to restrain the Town Council from dumping refuse on the
beach of Table Bay to the nuisance of adjoining inhabitants.
In delivering the judgement of the court, De Villiers CJ allowed
the application and held that the refuse constituted a threat to
public health, i.e t a nuisance to the public of Cape Town at
large. The Court regarded the applicant as one of the members of
the public and was entitled to make the application to restrain
the nuisance In any public place in the town, and upon any part
of the beach in the neighbourhood of the town . One interesting
point which De Villiers CJ made in his concluding remarks was
that it would be absurd to say that Dell should have waited until
I
his health had been affected by the nuisance. As such the court
was justified in granting the interdict taking into account the




(1879) 9 Buch 2.
9
be to injure his health . That alone was an indication that he had
made out a prima facie case to justify the granting of an
interdict in his favour. The Dell_decis_ion is__S.p_ut h_ Afri _c..an
authority for the view that it is competent to anyone of the
public to take proceedings to abate a nuisance of a public
nat.ure c "
The South Afr ican courts have repeatedly reaffirmed that South
African law knows no actio popularis. It was always required of
the applicant to demonstrate a direct, personal interest in the
administrative action under challenge. It lS now generally
accepted that the actio popularis or actions in the public
interest indeed never formed part of South African law. The case
of Bagnall v The Colonial Government2 2 is the leading authority
ln this regard. The Bagnall case happens to be the first c a s e in
which a South African court roundly denounced the idea of an
action in the public interest. In this case the Honourable Chief
Justice, De Villiers CJ remarked that: ~As to our law, I am not
aware that any South African court has ever recognized the right
of any individual to vindicate the rights of the publ ic where he
himself has not sustained any direct inj ury or damage from a
breach of the law'. The Chief Justice went on to say that: ~Under
our law an action can only be brought by or on behalf o f a person
to whom a debt is owing, or who has sustained damage, or is
likely to sustain damage, by reason of an injury done to him o r
breach of duty owing to him,or whose rights have been otherwise
infringed or threatened to be i nfringed' . 2 3
The Bagnall decision was also confirmed by the Appellate Division
in the case of Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern










follows: 'The actio popularis is undoubtedly obsolete, and no one
can bring an action and allege that he is bringing an action in
the interest of the public, but by our law any person can bring
an action to vindicate a right which he possesses whatever that
right may be and whether he suffers special damage or not,
provided he can show that he has a direct interest in the matter
and not merely the interest which all citizens have' . 25
Turning now to the exceptions to the general principle which
allows a litigant to come to court solely in order to vindicate
the public interest an exposition of case law is necessary. These
are the exceptions to the rule that the claim must be tied to a
direct, personal and sufficient interest in the action concerned.
There are reported cases that may be said to have been brought
in the public interest. Some of these cases succeeded and some
failed (These cases will be considered below). The following
exceptions have been recognized: 26
(a) Principle in Patz v Greene & Co
The case Patz v Greene2~ovides some flexibility with regard
to the principle that a litigant cannot be allowed to come to
court with a view to vindicate the public interest. In this case
the applicant applied for an interdict against an alleged illegal
administrative action. The court held that where the prohibition
is in the public interest, then any member of the public who can
prove that he has sustained damage is entitled to his remedy. In
this sense damage refers to an encroachment on a right
(statutory), and where the statute is in the interest of the
public at large, any member may apply for a remedy but must also





See Baxter op cit at 658.
1907, TS 425.
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In short, the court laid down the following rule: (1) Where a
statute was enacted in the interests of a particular class of
persons, any member of that class could take action to enforce
it, irrespective of whether he personally was adversely affected
by non-compliance with it; (2) where a statute was enacted in the
public interest, any member of the public who could show that he
was adversely affected by non-compliance with it would have locus
standi to enforce it. This rule was accepted as authority in all
cases where an applicant's locus standi was to be considered in
an attack on alleged illegal administrative action.
The Patz v Greene & Co principle has been applied in numerous
cases (discussed below) .28 In nearly all instances the applicant
who wished to approach the court in a matter where the
environment is allegedly harmed had to ask the court to exercise
its powers of review of the action in the public interest. The
only obstacle that an applicant faced was that he or she had to
show that he or she sustained damage as indicated above.
One of the criticisms levelled against this judgement comes from
Rabie2 9 who pointed out that in stipulating an additional
requirement, viz damage or personal loss, the judgement imposes
an undesirable burden in respect of locus standi. His criticism
is directed at the 'presumption of damage I for its
inappropriateness, since the general interest which the
individual has in the observance of rules governing a general
relationship, is not based on an assumed loss or damage but on
the interest he has in the correct application of the law in that
general relationship. Furthermore it has been argued by some
critics that the rule in Patz v Greene which has dominated the
issue of standing for a number of years is not absolute in that
2 8 See Director of Education, Transvaal v McCagie & Others
1918 AD 616; Smalberger v Cape Town Ltd 1979 (3) SA 457 (c); and
also BEF (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1983 SA 387 (C) 400.
2 9 . See M A Rabie 'Locus Standi tot 'n Inerdik ' 1972 THRHR
375.
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it is no more than an aid to statutory interpretation, and that
the decisive consideration must always be the intention of the
legislature. 3o
The Patz rule has dominated the issue of locus standi for so long
that one would have thought that it is absolute, however, just
at the time when many of us hailed it as being tantamount to a
revival of the actio popularis, others felt that it is no more
than an aid to statutory interpretation as discussed above. It
follows that the rule leaves much to be desired, more so because
it requires the applicant to prove special damage or personal
harm, another setback towards the movement for the total
liberation of the locus standi requirement.
In my mind, it would have been appropriate for the court to allow
standing to any member of the public to bring an action in the
public interest where the action arises out of the contravention
of legislation. The case of Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council
v Eastern Properties (Prop) Ltd3 1 serves as a good example in
this regard. In delivering the judgement of the court, Stratford
JA held that, 'where it appears either from a reading of the
enactment itself or from that plus a regard to surrounding
circumstances that the legislature has prohibited the doing of
an act in the interest of any person or class of persons, the
intervention of the court can be sought by any such person to
enforce the prohibition without proof of special damage' .32
Despite all these criticisms the Patz
applied in the following cases: In BEF
rule was successfully
(Ptiy) Ltd v Cape Town
30 See T P van Reenen 'Locus Standi in South African
Environmental Law: A Repraisal in International and Comparative






Municipality 3 the Patz Principle was invoked in support of the
standing of residents who sought to enforce compliance with a
town planning scheme created for their benefit. In Director of
Educa tion, Transvaal v McGagie3 4 legislation prescribing the
procedure and required qualifications for the appointment of
headmasters was enacted. These were held to have been enacted in
the interests of all applicants for the post. Therefore,
unsuccessful applicants had standing to challenge the validity
of the appointment when it was made.
The case of Bamford v Minister of communitY~d State Auxiliary
Services3 5 provides a good example of instances where the court
could allow standing to any member of the public to bring an
action in the public interest where the action arises out of the
contravention of legislation. In this case Mr Bamford, Member of
Parliament for the Groote Schuur constituency and permanently
resident in Rondebosch, brought an urgent application for an
interim order interdicting the respondent from proceeding further
with the erection of certain residences on the Groote Schuur
Estate at Rondebosch. In terms of Act 9 of 1910, continued public
access to the park on the Groote Schuur Estate was preserved and
no suburban dwellings could be erected on the property at any
time. This Section had to be read with the Preamble and the
Second Schedule to the Act which states that the government of
the Republic of South Africa holds the Groote Schuur Estates
subject to the conditions contained in the will of Cecil John
Rhodes. Of particular relevance is paragraph 1 of the Second
Schedule to the Act which provides that continued public access
to the 'park' on the Groote Schuur Estate is to be preserved.
*" The appJ j cant...-cont.e.nded_tbat...-a.s_a_memb..e_r of the public=-be wa/?









re..si-deXl.Ges..-GQ.r:J...t;.J;.a-E:Y-:-to~ t.he.i.Ieg i ,s l a t .i.ve.._:Q..t:ov i ~ i on~~l.d-,ex.a.d.e
an.d-e.Y..e.n.t..u.a.lL~i.t~le._"a'way:.__tl::1e...,]::,.i "gb.t.s .._..o£-p.ub~i.G._.a,c.c.eB.S-t.Q....1..b,e
Peg,x,k. Furthermore, he contended that the government, acting
through the respondent, was erecting a number of residences in
a portion of the park, which had already reduced and would i n
future reduce his right as a member of the public to have access
to the park . The respondent contended, inter alia, that the
applicant had no locus standi, since his position as a Member of
Parliament did not give him the locus standi, to sue on behalf
of the public, nor had he alleged that he had ever used the right
of access to the park, nor that he had intended to do so, and was
now prevented from doing so.
An i mp o r t a n t question raised by the court was whether the
legislature prohibited the action in the interests of any
particular person or class of persons, or whether it was
prohibited merely in the public interest. In this regard,
Watermeyer JP held that in the fi rst case any such person can
enforce the prohibition without proof of damage, but in the
second case a member of the public must show special damage or
an apprehension of damage in order to have locus standi.
In this case the main issue (a view objected to by the
respondent) was that the applicant (as an individual) also has
an interest in compliance with the rules and r e gu l a t i on s
governing the general relationship without proving that he has
suffered real prejudice o r might suffer potential prejudice . The
respondent's objection was that Bamford's interest was one shared
by every other member of the public and thus not an interest
suff iciently peculiar to him and as such he has no standing to
vindicate 'the public interest'. This objection was dismissed by
the court. Watermeyer JP held that the relevant legislation
regarding access of the public to the park, does not prohibit
anything but that i t confers a right of access on all members of
the public, and any unlawful interference with that right can be
restrained by any member of the public without proof of special
damage. It was not therefore necessary for the applicant to
15
allege that he has used the park in the past nor that he wants
to use it in the future.
The court held that Mr Bamford did have locus standi, because the
statute 'confers a right of access on all members of the public,
and any unlawful interference with that right can be restrained
by any member of the public without proof of special damage' .36
This appears to be a bold decision in the sense that an applicant
does not have to show proof of a personal loss. Another
interesting point is that the court held, further, that it was
impractical to expect proof from the applicant of actual
prejudice suffered by him, since the statutory rules in question
may, at that stage, not yet have been broken. All that is
required is that his rights, freedoms and privileges may possibly
be affected.
Interestingly enough, the bold and quite liberal Bamford approach
was supported in the judgement of Eloff DJP in ~ks en-ande~
.J,.acQ12fL_e...IJ......:.n=.ande,r,.37 The application in this case arose from
the notorious decision of the Conservative Party-Controlled
Carletonville City Council in 1988 and 1990 to reserve public
parks in the town for the exclusive use of whites in terms of the
subsequently repealed Reservation of Separate Amenities Act 49
of 1953, a decision which had precipitated a damaging consumer
boycott. Responding to a complain about vagrancy in one park, the
council had adopted a reservation in favour of whites which was
applicable, without explanation or reservation, to all parks in
the white residential area and one in the business centre. This
decision had drastically prejudicial consequences for both the
residents of Carletonville and its broader community.
Three applicants applied for an order declaring the decision of
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was a white resident of Carletonville, that he was a ratepayer
and that he was a director of and in full control of a hardware
shop in the town. The second applicant was a resident of
Khutsong, a Black residential area outside the municipal area of
Carletonville. The third respondent was an Indian man who did not
live in Carletonville but was the manager of and had an interest
in a clothing shop in the town. Both of these shops were
drastically affected by a consumer boycott by the local black
population instituted as a result of the decision of the city
council to reserve the use of the parks for whites.
The main issue of concern was the locus standi of the applicants
to seek an order invalidating the city council's decision. In
fact the respondent challenged the locus standi of all three of
the applicants. The Court found that in the circumstances the
first and third applicants did not have locus standi.
On appeal in Jacobs en 'n ander v Waks en eiidexe" it was
contended on behalf of the appellants that the description by the
respondents of their involvement in their respective business was
too vague. There was, so it was contended, no indication that
they were shareholders in the business or that they had a
financial or legal interest in the businesses. It was also
contended that there was no causal connection between the city
council's decision to reserve the use of the parks for whites and
the ensuing drop in turnover.
with regard to the first respondent, the appellants contended
that the ordinary rule that a municipal ratepayer has sufficient
interest in the application of municipal funds to clothe him with
locus standi did not apply in the instant case because of the
following factors: that the spending on the requisite notice
boards to enforce the decision was so small that it could not
give rise to a real interest; that the rule was based on the
relationship of trust between the city council and the ratepayer
38 1992 (1) SA 521.
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and that relationship of trust was not breached in the instant
case where the first respondent, as a white person, was not
prejudiced by the decision; and that the first respondent could
not complain that the decision was not to the advantage of the
city council.
In delivering the decision of the Court Botha JA began by
defining locus standi: 'In general the requirement of locus
standi means that someone who seeks relief must have a sufficient
interest in the subject matter of the litigation to persuade the
court that his claim should be adjudicated. It is not a technical
concept with rigidly defined boundaries. The requirement is most
commonly described by saying that a plaintiff or applicant must
have a direct interest in the relief sought (it must not be too
remote); alternatively, it is also said that, in the context of
the facts, there must be a real interest (not an abstract or
academic one), or that it must be a present interest (not a
hypothetical one)' 39
Botha JA remarked that the first and third applicants had locus
standi first on the basis of their interests in Carletonville
businesses which were suffering a substantial drop in turnover
as a result of a black consumer boycott in the protest against
the city's decision. Someone who, like the first applicant, was
a director ln full control of a company which ran a business or
who, like the third applicant, was the manager of a business had
a real interest in its prosperity and profitability; since it was
clear that the consumer boycott would end and the turnover of
their businesses be restored if the city council's decision was
set aside, the first and third applicants had a sufficiently
direct interest to give them locus standi. 4 0
Another reason why the first applicant, a Carletonville
39
40
At 533J-534B, in translation from t h e Afrikaans text.
At 534F-535E.
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ratepayer, continued Botha JA , had locus standi to challenge the
council's decision was the established principle that a municipal
:r.a t ep_ay_e r__h a .s_ l Q.Ql S standi to ap.:Pl.¥--t.o court for t he--S.B..t.ti n .g
asi de of an llnlawf.u l appr.opri ..a1:..i.o1L..oLmJln i ci pal funds by a c m
c_o~il . A rate~ayer's interest in ~~~llthor jzed use of
~p..a.L£:lJrnds..-w.a.S3_s.u£..f..i.ci.en:L_to confe r locus S ta n di t. o r e strain
the-i..m.p..];Q~peIJ..di.t.w::.e of such~, a nd it was no t ne.ce£.S3aq
~hat, in addj tjQ~~~ of his d
pav e.._D-e.e.n-v.i nlat..ed . 4 1
A further ground upon which the third applic~nt (an Indian man
who, prior to the decision of the Carletonville City Council, was
accustomed to playing , with his grandson in one of the parks
subsequently reserved for the use of whites had locus standi was
that parks, said Botha JA, were held in trust by the council for
the use of the general public, including non-residents of
Carletonville. That being so, the third appl icant had a direct
i nterest in the matter, for his right to use the park had been
interfered with by the counc i Lv f
To sum up this well reasoned judgement delivered by Botha JA, one
can safely conclude that like earlier courts, t.he Appellate
Division in Jacobs required the applicants, In order to enjoy
locus standi, to establish a personal interest in the outcome of
the proceedings which was not common to all members of the
public. The court has therefore not revived the long-defunct
actio popularis in the realm of standing to apply for the review
of decisions of executive bodies, but it has developed the law
III three respects, b¥ recognizi~Jry to di gni t y a s a b aaip
\!p0n wb i ch ZQ..c.us-s t an d.i--m-i"gg:j; Qe c lai med ,. b y ] av ; og down .t bat i,;l.
~J--L~...J..L.b. -.!.!~~ ........!.u;;;....J..J.I;;;,.u ...l.-w.J.....u~-.....J..!. Q Cll Ss..t.andi_Q.~.r_Qllll.d...-Q f all
~tl,t-e.Laa.t...Jd.hi...c;;Jl..,d.Q.e~_t.Q....a..l..e_ga l Jy enforceable ri ght of






be dealt with in a substantive and practical manner rather than
a formalistic or technical one. 4 3
A contrary view was held in the case of South African Optometrist
Association v Frames Distributors (pty) Ltd T/A Frames
Unlimited. 4 4 In this case the court held that where the statute
prohibits the performance of any particular act which affects the
public at large, no person has a right of action against another
person merely because that other person has performed the
prohibited act. It is incumbent upon the party complaining to
allege and prove that the doing of the act has caused him some
special damage or that the statute concerned is one which was
enacted in his special interest.
(b) Standing for Interdict de Libero Homine Exhibendo (habeas
Corpus) and Related Interdicts
Another notable exception is the standing requirements for the
'habeas corpus' remedy which appear to be much more liberal than
normal. The 'habeas corpus' is a remedy designed to place under
review the lawfulness of a deprivation of personal liberty,
aiming ultimately at the release of an individual from unlawful
detention. The case of Bozzolli v Station Commander, John Vorster
Square, Johannesburg4 5 is a good example of a situation whereby
an individual as a party can be accorded standing to apply for
an interdict on behalf of (a) detainee (s). In this case the
principal of the Witwatersrand University had unsuccessfully
applied for an order for the release of a number of students of
his university who had been detained.
43 See Annual Law Survey of South African Law, 'Civil
Procedure' Juta & Co, Limited, 1992 at 568.
44
45
1985 3 SA 100 (D).
1972 (3) SA 934 (W).
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In Wood v Ondangwa Tribal Authority 4 6 the court a quo maintained
that the applicants, two church leaders and the secretary of a
political party (SWAPO), and the persons who were threatened with
detention were members, respectively, of the church's
congregation and the political party, did not have locus standi.
However, what is of importance is the pronouncements of the
Appellate Division on the question of locus standi delivered by
Rumpff CJ who referred to the Bozzoli case and was prepared to
give a wider interpretation to 'special interest' in that the
'habeas corpus' may be obtained by a friend or relative of the
detainee. He went further to hold that where the detainee has no
kith or kin, a 'good Samaritan' who comes to his aid could hardly
fail to be a friend or relative of the detainee. He further
stressed that the applicant does not purport to act on behalf of
the community at large but as a negotiorum gestor or curator ad
litem on behalf of the detainee. 4 7
It is submitted that in the case of 'habeas corpus' remedies,
departure from the normally strict rules relating to standing
constitutes no more than an apparent exception to the principle
that individuals require a direct and personal interest in order
to enjoy standing. There is no doubt that emphasis was placed
upon the fact that 'illegal deprivation of liberty is a threat
to the very foundation of a society based on law and order',
signifying that the consideration of the public interest played
an important part in the decision. 48 However, Rumpff CJ was
quick to remark that the mere fact that someone other than the
person directly affected by the action complained of is allowed
to approach the court does not reintroduce the actio popularisi
the interest involved is still one which is personalized in the
sense that there is a clearly identifiable individual whose








(c) Public Authorities as Representatives of the Public Interest
It has long been recognized that public authorities may act as
'<;...,--~. ,--_.._,.-
repres~:g.tatives of the public interests in rnat t.e r sTa.l Li.nq within
-----,~-_._.---,.~.,...
their regulatory jurisdiction. Therefore, a local authority may
sue for the abatement of a public nuisancei stand against other
authorities to protect the interests of residents falling within
its jurisdictioni stand to seek enforcement of parliamentary and
admInistrative legislation as well as town-planning conditions.
In this capacity the local authority acts as representative and
guardian of the inhabitants of the township.49
In the field of administrative law, the courts have readily
recognized the standing of local authorities to attack the
administrative decisions of other public authorities where it is
believed that they are invalid and that they might have
undesirable consequences for the residents falling within the
jurisdiction of the local authority. The case of Bri ts Town
Council v Pienaar NOS 0 is illustrative of this viewpoint. This
is one case where an applicant who had applied unsuccessfully to
the council for certain business licences had successfully
appealed to the provincial administrator against the refusal. The
court recognized that the council was entitled to seek review of
the administrator's decision because it was the ~guardian and
representative of its ratepayers' and it had a duty to ensure
that the best interests of the latter were safeguarded. 51
In a number of cases it was also submitted that the standing of
local authorities to seek enforcement of parliamentary and
administrative legislation, as well as town-planning conditions,
has been regularly recognized by the courts again on the ground
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the inhabitants of the township' .52 This is clearly illustrated
in Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties (Prop)
Ltd,53 where Stratford JA held that 'where it appears either
from the reading of the enactment itself or from that plus a
regard to surrounding circumstances that the legislature .has
prohibited the doing of an act in the interest of any person or
class of persons, the intervention of the court can be sought by
any such person (e.g, the municipality) to enforce the
prohibition without proof of special damage' .54
The other case worth noting is Transvaal Canoe Union v
Butgerei~5 where an application was made for a declaration of
rights. According to the applicants (the first applicant being
a voluntary association whose members consist of several canoe
clubs), they were entitled to paddle their canoes along a public
river [a res publica] . The first respondent was a riparian owner
who contended that the canoeists were trespassing, since her land
stretched to the middle point of the r i.ver. In terms of its
constitution, the Canoe Union was a legal persona and its
executive committee could 'act for and on behalf of the Union in
any matter or litigation or where any action on behalf of the
Union is necessary in the discretion of the executive
committee' .56 without arguing the point any further, Eloff DJP
held that as the Canoe Union's own interests were involved it had
locus standi to bring the case.
What in fact is suggested is that where the matter concerns
52 See Madrassa Anjuman Islamia v Johannesburg Municipali ty
1917 AD 718; City Council of Johannesburg v Berger 1939 WLD 87;
and Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties
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legislation enacted in the public interest a right of action
should be available if an infringement of the right has occurred
or is reasonably apprehended; where the legislature intended the
remedy concerned to be available; and if the legislature intended
that any member of the public or representative organization
should be able to enforce such remedy. In my view there are
certain issues which are so important to society that any person
should be able to take up the cudgels in the interest of the
publicI and that l with regard to enforcement of legislation l such
an intention may be ascribed to the legislature.
(d) Ratepayers
Traditionally I the courts have always been reluctant to recognize
a general right to standing to taxpayers as opposed to
ratepayers. The latter have fared better. The courts have in a
number of earlier decisions departed from the relatively narrow
approach traditionally adopted towards the rules relating to
standing. They have recognized that ratepayers may challenge the
validity of action taken by their local authorities.
Various reasons have been advanced for distinguishing ratepayers
from taxpayers. It was generally felt that to recognize a group
as wide as that of taxpayers would come close to recognizing a
general right of standing on the part of the public to challenge
any administrative action financed from the fiscus. A more
realistic explanation of the anomaly is that the courts fear that
by recognizing taxpayer standing l in the same way that they have
recognized the standing of ratepayers I they might open the
floodgates to an official action from an extremely wide group of
potential litigants. 57
57 Baxter op cit at 659.
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The case of Verstappen v Port Edward Town Board and Others5 8 is
illustrative of a situation where ratepayers can seek locus
standi in judicio with a view to abate a nuisance of a public
nature. In this case the applicant sought to establish her locus
standi in judicio to apply for an interdict restraining the first
respondent local authority from committing the illegality of
operating the waste disposal site without the required permit on
the basis that she was a ratepayer of the first respondent and
that in several reported cases the courts had afforded ratepayers
the right to interdict local authorities from dealing with their
funds or property contrary to law. 5 9
In order to determine whether, said Magid J, a member of the
public has locus standi to prevent the commission of an act
prohibited by statute, the first enquiry is whether the
legislature prohibited the doing of the act in the interests of
any particular person or class of persons or whether it was
merely prohibited in the public interest. If the former, any
person who belongs to the class of persons in whose interests the
doing of the act was prohibited may interdict the act without
proof of any special damage. If not, the applicant must prove
that he has suffered or will suffer such special damage as a
result of the doing of the act.
The Court, per Magid J, accordingly held that it did not consider
that the mere fact that some municipal funds were obviously spent
in managing and operating the waste disposal site in question
could conceivably afford the applicant locus standi to interdict
what she regarded as an illegality. The Court held that it had
not been established on the papers that the first respondent's
manner of operation of waste disposal site was more expensive








In my view, the Court arrived at a correct decision in that the
Legislature intended its provisions to operate in the interests
of the public at large. In this regard, the applicant failed to
show that the contravention of the Act by the respondent has
caused or is likely to cause her some special damage. It follows
that a right should be infringed or a threat of such violation
should for the purpose of proving locus standi.
(e) Actio popularis (citizen's action)
The fifth possible exception is the actio popularis found in
Roman Law which could be instituted by any member of the public
to prevent violations of res sacrae and res publicae. The
actiones populares originated in Roman law and were used for a
particular group of actions which could be instituted by any
member of the community. The actio popularis was not a single
action, but included a variety of actions, the distinguishing
feature of which was that the plaintiff or applicant need not
have been personally involved in or affected by the act upon
which the action was based. It was destined to serve the
interests of the people. It is trite law that the actio popularis
fell into desuetude during the era of Roman-Dutch law. 6 1
Having analyzed the exception to the general principle that a
person cannot be allowed to come to court solely in order to
vindicate the public interest unless his or her claim is tied to
a direct, personal and sufficient interest ln the action
concerned, one also needs to look at another important issue
which is closely connected to the problem of standing. In fact,
before the enactment of the new South African constitution, the
burning question that faced every environmental lawyer was how
environmental rights and interests could be protected, and the
61 See J D van der Vyver 'Actiones Popularis and the
Problem of Standing in Roman-Dutch, South African Law' 1978 Acta
Juridica 191.
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quest for an answer involved an analysis of whether such rights
were recognised and afforded protection at common law and by
statute. The other question that is of particular relevance is
the extent to which the South African law recognised and
protected such a right. In this regard there is still dissension
amongst academics on whether or not our common law has the
capacity to recognize and protect environmental rights. 6 2
Van Niekerk63 argues that the common law is the ideal vehicle
for the protection of environmental rights. This is evidenced by
his call for the recognition in our law of an ecological norm.
The question that he raised was whether in law generally (and in
South African law in particular) recognition could not be given
to a general jurisprudential norm against ecological damage; a
norm which would be operative in all fields of the law both
national and international and on all levels of the
administration of justice. From the question raised above the
only argument that could be pursued here is the basic argument
that on all levels of juridical decision-making, the protection
of the environment has become a matter of such importance that
it should consciously be allowed to assume its role as one of the
major concerns of the law. Put the other way round, his claim is
that even if no remedy was effectively available to the
individual or the community, the legal profession could use its
ingenuity to find some legal remedy.
The strength of the arguments put forward above can be tested by
asking ourselves the question whether the South African law
indeed provides any common-law remedy that could be invoked to
the protect environmental interests as Van Niekerk proposed. Once
again legal academics seem to be divided on this issue. It would
62 See R Lyster .... The Protection of Environmental Rights I
(1992) 109 SALJ 518-524.
63. See Barend van Niekerk .... The ecological norm in law or




seem that even though private-law remedies exist, their impact
on environmental conservation is very slight. 6 4 One of the
problems identified was that while an interdict is potentially
a valuable remedy, its effectiveness was narrowed down by the
requirement that there be no adequate alternative remedy. This
problem was further exacerbated by the locus standi requirements
which rendered the successful claiming of civil remedies and
judicial review problematic since the plaintiff was required to
demonstrate a direct personal interest in the relief claimed. 65
Cowen6 6 is totally opposed to the argument that the common law
is capable of meeting the challenge of the environment. He claims
that the common law is particularly incapable of meeting the
challenge of the environment, since it protects and enforces only
private rights and obligations. His main argument is that 'if
South African lawyers concerned with the protection of the
environment are to be relevant and effective, they must reach out
beyond the principles, concepts and underlying philosophies of
conventional branches of law i for these have grave inherent
limitations in the specific context of the environmental
challenge. The conventioal branches of law were in large measure
designed to cope with different problems from those presented by
the need to protect the environment in modern industrialised
societies and the developing countries' .
Properly evaluated, this argument suggests that Van Niekerk fails
to appreciate the fact that environmental law is concerned with
enforcing the public interest in environment quality, aiming at
all times to balance the public interest and private rightsi and
64 Noted by the South African Law Commission (See the
discussion of 'Remedies in environmental law' in the Interim
Report on Group and Human Rights, 1991, pp 542-3.
See Bamford v Minister of Communi ty Development and
State Auxiliary Services 1981 (3) SA 1054 (C).
66. See D V Cowen 'Toward Distinctive Principles of South
African Environmental Law: Some jurisprudential perspectives and
a role for legislation' (1989) 52 THRHR 3 at 8.
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that while common law remedies offered by the law of delict in
respect of injury to person are unquestionably at a plaintiff~s
disposal if he can demonstrate a threat to his health, the
requirements of standing remain an obstacle.
In the public-law sphere an individual or group occupying a
subservient position could not champion the ~public interest' in
a dispute against the state administration but has also to prove
a direct or personal interest in the case. 6 7 Since environmental
law has developed a unique public-law character, governmental
control of the environment has increased, leaving the individual
in a much weaker position to vindicate the public (environmental)
interest. 6 8 This had led to the denial of the individual and
~groupl interests in the broader general interest in which they
shared (i.e. an interest in a healthy environment and the duty
to prevent air or water pollution). As a result of this
development, many ~ faceless I offenders were never brought to
book.
In what Loot.s'" describes as "mi s sed opportunity for judicial
reform', the South African Appellate Division delivered a
judgement which could have set our courts on the same road at
much the same time that the Indian Supreme Court took the first
steps along the road to the judicial reform of the doctrine of
standing. The case of Cabinet of the Transitional Government for
the Territory of South West Africa v Eins7 0 is one example where
the Appellate Division itself missed a golden opportunity to
liberalize the law of standing for the purpose of constitutional
litigation.
67 See Cheryl Loots "Loaue Standi to Claim Relief in the
Public Interest' 1989 SALJ 131-2.
68. See Elmene Bray ~Locus standi in environmental law' 1989
CILSA 33-8.
69. Loots ~Standing to enforce fundamental rights', SAJHR,
1994, 51 -9.
70. 1988 (3) SA 369 (A).
29
The facts of this case have nothing to do with any threat to the
environment but from them comes a good illustration of how
reluctant our courts were to adopt a liberal approach to
standing. This case was brought before the Appellate Division on
appeal from the Supreme Court of South West Africa (as it then
was). Eins applied for an order declaring legislation invalid in
terms of the South West Africa Constitution Act 39 of 1968. The
legislation was an Act passed by the Legislative Assembly which
authorized the Transitional Cabinet to prohibit certain persons
from being within the territory or order them to be removed from
the territory if it had reason to believe that such persons
endangered, or were likely to endanger, the security of the
territory or its inhabitants or the maintenance of public order,
or that such persons endangered, or were likely to endanger, a
feeling of hostility between members of the different population
groups of the territory. The persons who could be prohibited or
removed in terms of this legislation were not rendering service
in the defence force or employed by the government.
Eins alleged that he was one of thousands of people who were
permanent residents of South West Africa but who were not born
in the territory and could therefore be prohibited from being in
the territory or removed from the territory in terms of the Act.
It was submitted that the Act deprived Eins, and obviously others
in his position, of fundamental right to reside in South West
Africa, which was guaranteed by the constitution, and supplanted
such right with a licence recoverable in the discretion of the
Cabinet of the Transitional Government of South West Africa.
The court of first instance declared the Act to be
unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable for want of
compliance with the Bill of Fundamental Rights incorporated in
the South West Africa Legislative and Executive Authority
Establishment Proclamation R101 of 1985, enacted in terms of s
38 of the South West Africa Constitution Act 39 of 1968. The
Appellate Division refused to consider the merits of the
application, holding that any action had been taken against him,
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or that the Cabinet intended to take any action against him in
terms of the Act. From this decision one learns that the court's
power to review legislation has been severely curtailed because
the court insisted that only people who have actually had action
taken against them in terms of the legislation have standing. To
make matters worse, a prejudicial action may be taken against
such persons before they could have an opportunity to seek
judicial redress. 71
The Wood case" is also illustrative of the missed opportunity
as proposed by Loots. In this case church leaders were allowed
to claim an interdict in the interest of a large, vaguely
defined, group of persons who feared that they would be illegally
arrested, tried and subjected to summary punishment on account
of their political affiliations. The court took into account that
it would be impractical to expect the people under threat, many
of whom were tribesmen living about 800 kilometres from the seat
of the court, to approach the court themselves and therefore
allowed the applicants to represent their interests. This
decision could have been used by the courts as a precedent to
justify the relaxation of the traditional rules of standing in
other areas of law, but instead they limited its application to
matters involving violations of li~e, ~iberty or physical
integrity:. 73
"
This case also serves as one typical example of a situation where
the Appellate Division ~n effect singled out a common-law right
which it judged to be of s~ch importance that any member of the
public should be able to take action to enforce it even though
he or she was not personally affected or threatened. 74 Loot.s "
71 See Cheryl Loots
interest' SAJHR at 53.




Wood v Ondangwa Tribal Authori ty 1975 (2) SA 294 (A).
Loots op cit at 51.
Van Reenen op cit 125.
31
regards the decision in Wood as a very strong precedent in this
regard. Her view is that, the court can judge certain legislation
to be of such importance to the public interest that the
legislature must have intended that any person could enforce it.
Although the case does not deal specifically with the violation
of environmental rights, its decision could have been used by the
courts as a precedent to justify the relaxation of the
traditional rules of standing in other areas of law as well,
instead of limiting its application to matters involving
violations of life, liberty or physical integrity. (Similarly,
the Appellate Division itself missed a golden opportunity to
liberalize the law of standing for the purpose of constitutional
litigation in the case of Cabinet of the Transitional Government
for the Territory of South West Africa vEins 1988 (3) SA 369
(A) ) .
The above analysis of the extent to which the common law
guarantees the right to standing to protect the environment
suggests the need to change the environmental statutes in order
to solve the problems of standing. It is submitted that our
statutes should be made to apply more widely in the sense that
they should authorize any person or organization to bring a civil
action claiming the enforcement of the provisions thereof without
the necessity of proving an interest or personal damage in the
relief claimed. In my view, the only change that this innovation
would make to the present common law position is that, it would
not be necessary to prove that the applicant is personally
adversely affected by the illegality alleged. Both the Interim
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 and
the final Constitution of South Africa (May, 1996) provide
likewise. These two constitutions will be the subject of
discussion in the two chapters that follow. The question that we
have to ask ourselves is whether or not these constitutions fully
liberate the standing requirement.
75 Loots op cit at 51-3.
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I
3. STANDING UNDER THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA ACT 200 OF 1993
The Constitution relaxes the traditional rules of legal standing
with respect to infringements of or threats to both the
fundamental rights entrenched in Chapter 3 (the Bill of Rights)
and those that fall beyond this Chapter by granting standing to
persons acting as members of or in the interest of a group or
class of persons and persons acting in the public interest. 76
Regrettably, this Constitution is not without drawbacks. 7 7
The greatest challenge facing our courts is to interpret and
implement this extended locus standi requirement and explicitly
recognized actio popularis in the light of s 29 of the
Constitution. By so doing our courts, especially the
Constitutional Court, will be able to develop authoritative case
law that will form part of our law. One of the positive aspects
of the Bill of rights is that it has overcome some of the
problems of access to justice encountered ln environmental
litigation in the public law field in South Afri~a. The
Constitution has finally moved away from the restrictive approach
to standing thereby allowing the courts to open up their doors
to potential plaintiffs who have been denied standing in terms
of the Common law.
3.1 Access to environmental justice
South African courts have, in the past, adopted a restrictive
approach to the issue of standing in the sense that standing was
only accorded to an applicant seeking to vindicate a private
interest. This approach required that a person who approaches the
court is entitled to claim only relief which is in his or her own
76 Section 7.
77 The criticisms levelled against special environmental
provisions will be outlined below.
33
interest. It would appear that the aforementioned requirement has
been restrictively interpreted in order to preclude an
organisation from coming to court as representative of the
interests of its members, as distinct from its own interests. As
a result, this limitation hampered the effective utilisation by
all potential beneficiaries of the opportunities available for
recourse to the law.
The Constitution contains provisions aimed both at broadening the
array of environmental issues which can be brought before courts
and extending the range of people with effective access to
environmental justice. Therefore, even if judges choose to
interpret the new provisions restrictively the constitutional
standing requirement will ensure that people are able to enforce
their rights without being confronted by a variety of technical
procedural hurdles. 78
The broadening of the locus standi requirement promises
interesting changes in the sphere of environmental law, since an
individual or group can now act on behalf of the community or the
general public, for example, to combat air or water pollution
wi thout having to prove personal damage. Nevertheless, the
question is how this broadened concept of locus standi and actio
popularis will be interpreted and implemented in the light of
section 29 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
3.2 Application of the Bill of Rights
Winstanle y 7 9 submits that the practical effect of the
environmental right in any given situation will depend to a large
extent on the applicability of the Bill of Rights. Section 7(2)
78 See Christina Murray 'Litigating in the Public Interest:
Intervention and the Amicus Curiae' SAJHR 1994 at 253.
79 T Winstanley 'Entrenching Environmental Protection in
the New Constitution' (1995) 1 SAJELP at 88.
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of the Interim Constitution provides that the chapter and the
rights entrenched within it apply to all law in force and all
administrative decisions taken and acts performed during the
period of operation of this Constitution. This includes: all law
in force on 27 April 1994 and all law that may come into force
during the currency of the interim Con s t i t.u t Lon : statutes of
parliament, statutes and ordinances of provincial government and
municipal by-lawsi administrative decisions taken or performed
during the currency of the Constitutioni and, the rules of the
common law and customary law. Furthermore, Section 7(1) of the
same constitution explicitly binds the legislative organs of the
state at all levels of government.
From these two provisions comes a very important question that
has been troubling academics up to this time. The question is
whether the Bill of Rights applies vertically or horizontally?
It would seem that the text itself does not clearly indicate
whether a vertical or horizontal application was intended.
Winstanle y 8 0 argues that if the Bill has vertical application
only, the environmental right will be of limited value and
besides that, the vertical application would create absurdity and
may also open the way for the serious abuse of rights.
Furthermore, she argues that many activities which impact on the
right of the individual to a healthy environment are performed
by private individuals or companies and not the state. In order
to justify her arguments, she gives the following example, that,
'if a court finds that an employer who permits smoking ln an
office building infringes a non-smoking applicant's right to an
(occupational) environment which is not detrimental to health and
well being, and the bill only applies vertically, then the result
would be that employees within a state building would be able to
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The question of application also came before our courts in the
following three recently reported cases, namely, Gardener v
Whi taker, 82 Mandel a v Fal a ti ,83 and De Kl erk and Ano ther v Du
Plessis and Others. 84 In regard to the first case (Whitaker) ,
the issue raised before the court was whether Chapter 3 of the
Constitution applies not only between an individual and organs
of the state (the so called "vertical" application), but also to
litigation between private individuals or entities ("horizontal"
application). It is submitted that an answer to this question is
to be sought in the provisions of the Constitution itself,
interpreted properly by having regard, inter alia, to comparative
law and the underlying values and objects of the Constitution.
The court found that 'there is no uniform and single answer to
the question of whether an alleged breach of a fundamental right
contained in chapter three can found an action between private
individuals I .85
Furthermore, the court also found that the use of the word "law"
in section 7 suggests that not only public law relations are
subj ect to the provisions of the chapter. This is further
supported by section 33 (2) which provides that neither the common
law nor customary law may infringe upon any fundamental right in
the chapter, otherwise than in terms of section 33 (1), the
general limitation clause. In addition section 33(3) recognises
common law and customary law rights not inconsistent with the
rights contained in the chapter, which would have been
unnecessary as far as private law matters were concerned if the
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In Mandela v Falad.. 86 the Court observed that before deciding
whether the constitutional right of freedom of expression had any
bearing on the matter, it first had to be determined whether the
Constitution has application to private disputes, that is,
whether it applies horizontally, between citizen and citizen, or
only vertically between the State and its citizens. The Court
held that although the framers of the constitution had not spelt
out in plain language what they intended in this regard, it
appeared to the Court that the Constitution applied ho.r i.z ont.a l.Ly .
The court also found that certain rights protected by the
Constitution pre-eminently required horizontal application. The
court accordingly concluded that the framers of the Constitution
intended that the rights necessary to conduct such activity could
be enforced as between individuals. It is submitted that although
the right which was the subject of litigation in the two cases
discussed above was freedom of expression, Winstanle y 87 argues
that it is quite reasonable to suggest that an environmental
right is similarly one which must have horizontal application.
Otherwise, a failure to treat environmental right as such would
seriously negate the essential content of the right in question.
In De Klerk and Another v Du Plessis and Others8 8 the Court
departed from the trend set in the earlier case, that Chapter 3
of the Bill of Rights applies horizontally. In this case, the
Court found itself unable to agree with the reasoning in Mandela
v Falati and found that the decision was wrongly decided. In
answering the question whether the framers of the Constitution
intended the Bill of Rights to have horizontal application, the
court held that the answer should be sought within the four
corners of the Constitution. It further held that traditionally
bills of rights have sought to strike a balance between
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protection against state tyranny. The Court concluded that
fundamental rights and freedoms are protected against State
action only. Furthermore, it is clear that where horizontal
application occurs, it is invariably provided in express terms.
The court went further to hold that it would be the correct
approach to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights provisions
in Chapter 3 of our Constitution to take the view that our
Constitution is a conventional cons t Ltiut.Lon unless there are
clear indications to the contrary, either in respect of Chapter
3 as a whole or in respect of individual sections thereof.
Nowhere does the Constitution contain an explicit provision that
the fundamental rights provisions have horizontal effect between
private citizens. Furthermore, section 33 (4) would be unnecessary
if Chapter 3 had horizontal effect. It also held that it is
inconceivable that the framers intended the whole body of private
law to become unsettled, as would be the consequence of
horizontal application. As a result, the court found itself
unable to agree with the reasoning in Mandela v Falati and found
that this decision was clearly wrong.
Lastly, to reinforce its support for the view that only vertical
application of the Bill of Rights was intended, the court held
that section 7(2) refers to "all law", this must be read as "all
public law applicable to the State and its organs". Furthermore,
section 7(4) (b) which widens the locus standi of litigants to
include the actio popularis, is not compatible with litigation
between private citizens. Moreover, the court further held that
the reasoning of the learned Judge in Mandela v Falati(supra)
that political activity occurs at grassroots level and that
therefore the drafters intended section 21 to have horizontal
application disregards the fact that historically political
activity was not inhibited by the citizenry but by State
repression. That is the evil the drafters sought to combat.
It could be argued that provision should be made for the Bill of
Rights to apply directly to private individuals, especially in
38
environmental cases. That is to say that the Bill should apply
horizontally as between private citizens. The rationale behind
this view is that if the Bill of Rights were to apply only
verticallYt I believe our courts will have serious difficulties
in applying the provisions of the constitution t for example t in
pollution related cases where only private individuals are
involved. In my view t it is reasonable to argue for the
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights as between private
citizens if we were to take environmental rights seriously.
Despite the fact that our Constitution does not expressly provide
for a direct application of fundamental rights as between
individuals the state is required to ensure that fundamental
rights are guaranteed as against third parties. It is submitted
that a purposive interpretation of the Bill of Rights would
certainly be preferable from an environmental perspective.
3.3 Interpretation and implementation by the court
The meaning of some of the provisions of the Constitution are
plain and may be ascertained from simply reading the text.
However t constitutional disputes can often not be resolved with
reference to the literal meaning of provisions. The Constitution
provides a framework for the exercise of state power. It seeks
to bind the government to the values underlying fundamental
rights and prescribes a process for political decision-making. 8 9
Consequently t the courts have to develop some form of controlling
mechanism to ensure that it is not flooded by mischief-makers and
buaybod i e s i " for example 7 (4) (b) :
(i) With regard to the interests required to obtain locus
8 9 See J de Waal & G Erasmus 'The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of South African Courts on the Application
t
Interpretation and Limitation of Fundamental Rights during the
Transition' Stellebosch Law Review 1996 2 at 180-1.
90 . See Cachalia et alt supra at 24.
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standi in the above instances, what type of interest is
required: a direct or substantial interest?
(ii) Under what circumstances would a class action be
appropriate?
(iii) what mechanisms would (or should) the courts devise to
prevent them from being swamped by undeserving
applications, especially where class actions and the actio
popularis are concerned?91
(iv) Finally, one must bear in mind that if our aims of
cultivating democratic values and an awareness of the
environment are to succeed, a narrow, positivistic
interpretation of the environmental right and locus
standi should not be tolerated.
This argument is supported by Section 35 of the Constitution
which provides that:
(a) in interpreting the provisions of Chapter 3, the court
shall promote the values which underlie an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall,
where applicable, have regard to public international law
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in





no law which limits any of the rights entrenched in this
chapter, shall be constitutionally invalid solely by
reason of the fact that the wording used prima facie
exceeds the limits imposed in this chapter, provided such
law is reasonably capable of a more restricted
interpretation which does not exceed such limits, in which
Ibid .
See Cachalia et al op cit at 121.
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event such law shall be construed as having a meaning in
accordance with the said more restricted
interpretation. 9 3
(c) in the interpretation of any law and the application and
development of common law and customary law, a court shall
have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this
chapter.
It is interesting to note that the Constitutional Court has, on
several occasions, committed itself to the IIpurposive ll approach
to interpretation. 94 In that sense the court has approved of an
interpretation it refers to as 11 generous 11 or IIbroad ll or
Illiberal 11 . 9 5 Apart from the above substantive clauses
(interpretation and application clauses) one needs to examine the
exact content of the locus standi requirement since it forms the
basis of this dissertation. This is provided in terms of section
7 of the Bill of Rights.
3.4 The locus standi clause
A closer look at Chapter 3 of the Constitution shows that section
7 confers locus standi on a wide spectrum of persons and groups.
This section introduces important and substantial changes to the
common law of standing. The common law has traditionally been
hostile to representative actions in circumstances where an
association, in its own right, has no direct substantial interest
in the subject matter of the dispute but seeks to act on behalf
of its members. 96 Section 7 provides that Chapter 3 binds all
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government. Furthermore, juristic bodies are also entitled to the
rights contained in Chapter 3 to the extent that the nature of
the rights permits it.
In analysing the first part of section 7, it is clear that
juristic persons, such as universities, welfare organizations,
companies, societies and clubs are also entitled to the rights
incorporated in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, although these bodies
are not bearers of individual human rights, they ~illstiJJ baue
locus standi to cbaJ J eng:.e~.itut.iill1.<a.l.ity of la..w.s tbat IJla.¥
GOnL~t-~h_thuaa-~~bLs (e.g. a company or society will have
locus standi to challenge air pollution which is unhealthy or
detrimental to the well-being of its employees or members and the
general public). The reason for this follows from s 35 which
provides that in interpreting the provisions of Chapter 3 the
court may have regard to comparable foreign case law.
The Canadian case of R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd97 illustrates this
point. In this case the company was charged for trading in
contravention of the Lord's Day Act. The company challenged the
constitutionality of this Act on the basis that it offended what
were clearly human rights (the right to freedom of religion
entrenched in the charter) However, in terms of the Canadian
Charter juristic persons are not bearers of rights. The
prosecution argued that freedom of religion is a personal freedom
and that a corporation, being a statutory creation, can not be
said to have a conscience or hold a religious belief. The Supreme
Court of Canada held that the question as to "whether a
corporation can enjoy or exercise freedom of religion is
irrelevant. The respondent is arguing that the legislation is
constitutionally invalid because it impairs freedom of religion
and if the law impairs freedom of religion it does not matter
whether the company can possess religious belief. An Accused
atheist would be equally entitled to resist a charge under the
Act. A law which itself infringes religious freedom is, by that
97 18 DLR (4th) at 321.
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reason alone, inconsistent with the charter and it matters not
whether the accused is a Christian, Jew, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist,
Atheist, Agnostic or whether an individual or a corporation. It
is the nature of the law, not the status of the accused, that is
in issue. ,,98
Section 7(4) of Chapter 3, entitled Fundamental Rights, 99
provides:
(a) When an infringement of or threat to any right entrenched in
this Chapter is alleged, any person referred to in paragraph
(b) shall be entitled to apply to a competent court of law
for appropriate relief, which may include a declaration of
rights.
(b) The relief referred to in paragraph (a) may be sought by:
(i) a person acting in his or her own interest.
(ii) an association acting in the interest of its members.
(iii) a person acting on behalf of another person who is not
in a position to seek such relief in his or her capacity
or name.
(iv) a person acting as a member of or in the interests of
a group or class of persons.
(v) a person acting in the public interest. Such a person
does not have to prove any personal harm or damage.
Loot s i ? ? argues that the effect of s 7 (4) is that 'any person or
organization may enforce the rights contained in the Bill of
Rights, irrespective of whether that person or organisation is
98
99
See Cachalia at 22 -3.
Commonly known as the Bill of Rights.
100
rights'
See Cheryl Loots 'Standing
(1994) 10 SAJHR at 49-50.
to enforce fundamental
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adversely affected by the alleged infringement of rights'. What
she suggests is that it will be possible to bring an action under
this section on behalf of plaintiffs who cannot be specifically
identified.
Contrary to Loots's views, Glazewski l Ol contends for a narrower
interpretation. He argues that the Bill of Rights admittedly
relaxes the locus standi requirement by granting standing to a
'person acting in the public interest of a group or class of
person' and 'a person acting in the public interest'. However
this only applies to an infringement of or threat to any right
entrenched in Chapter 3 and not to legal rules which fall outside
it. Furthermore, he argues that the locus standi requirement is
restricted in that regardless of who brings the action it is
still necessary to demonstrate that the health or well-being of
an individual or group is being threatened or harmed. He gives
the following example: that an environmental group or a concerned
individual wishing to oppose the establishment of waste disposal
site in the public interest on the ground that it infringes an
environmental or planning statute might not be assisted by this
clause. The applicant could arguably have standing if s/he could
show that the proposal is detrimental to his or health as
envisaged by section 29. 1 0 2
In my view, Glazewski 's view cannot be reconciled with the
decision in Ferreira v Levin No and Ot.liere'?", In this case, the
court was divided on the question of whether Applicants had locus
standi for a challenge based on section 25(3). In the view of
Akermann J, section 7(4) deals with the situation where "an
infringement of or threat to any right entrenched in this Chapter
is alleged" and it therefore applies specifically to the
1 01 See Jan Glazewski op cit at 7.
102 See T Winstanley 'Entrenching Environmental Protection
in the New Constitution' (1995) 1 SAJELP at 90-1.
1 03. CCT 5/95 (19 March 1996) .
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jurisdiction vested in the courts by section 98 (2) (a) and
101 (3) (a) of the Constitution to deal with lIany alleged violation
or threatened violation of any fundamental right entrenched in
Chapter 3 11 • But section 98 (2) vests a general jurisdiction in the
Court to interpret, protect and enforce the provisions of the
Constitution. Section 7(4) in dealing with the section 98(2) (a)
jurisdiction provides that where an infringement or threat to the
infringement of a constitutional right is alleged, any of the
persons referred to in section 7 (4) (b) will have standing to
bring the matter to 11 a competent court of Law'! . 1 04
Furthermore, the category of persons empowered to do so is
broader than the category of persons who have hitherto been
allowed standing in cases where it is alleged that a right has
been infringed or threatened, and to that extent the section
demonstrates a broad and not a narrow approach to standing.
Ordinarily a person whose rights are directly affected by an
invalid law in a manner adverse to such person, has standing to
challenge the validity of that law in the courts . 1 05 Section
7(4) does not, however, deal specifically with the jurisdiction
vested in the Court by the other subsections of section 98(2).
Section 98(2) (c) vests in this Court the jurisdiction to enquire
into the lithe constitutionality of any law, including an Act of
Parliament, irrespective of whether such law was passed before
or after the commencement of the Cons t Lt.ut i.on!' . The
constitutionality of a law may be challenged on the basis that
it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution other
than those contained in Chapter 3. 1 0 6
The majority of the Court (per Chaskalson P with Mohammed DP,
Didcott, Langa, Madala JJ and Trengove AJ concurring) disagreed
1 04 At 99A-B.
1 05 See Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern
properties (Pty) Ltd 1933 Ad 87 at 101.
1 0 6 . At 99C-D.
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with Ackermann Jls analysis of the issue of locus standi. In
their view Applicants had locus standi to challenge the section
on the basis of section 25(3) of the Constitution. Ordinarily a
person whose rights were directly and adversely affected by an
invalid law had standing to challenge the validity of that law
in the courts. Applicants had such an interest in the present
caae ."?"
Chaskalson J ruled that once it is accepted, as Akermann J has,
that the issue of constitutionality has to be tested objectively
and not subjectively, there is no valid reason for denying
persons in the position of the applicants standing to secure a
ruling on the validity of a law that directly affects their
interests. Further that even if section 7(4) were to be read
extensively as applying by inference to all the subsections of
section 98 (2), he would not see it as an obstacle to the
applicants I case. In that case it would have to be read as
meaning "where an infringement of or threat to any right
entrenched in this chapter (or any dispute over the
constitutionality of any executive or administrative act or
conduct or threatened administrative act or conduct of any organ
of the state, or any enquiry into the constitutionality of any
executive or administrative act or conduct or threatened
administrative act or conduct of any organ of the state, or any
enquiry into the constitutionality of any law, including an Act
of Parliament, irrespective of whether such law was passed or
made before or after the commencement of this Constitution) is
alleged" the persons referred to in paragraph (b) shall have
standing . 1 0 8
In conclusion, Chaskalson J went on to say that there would be
.no need on this extensive interpretation of the section to






his or her own interest must be a person whose constitutional
right has been irifringed or threatened. This is not what the
section says. What the section requires is that the person
concerned should make the challenge in his or her own interest.
It is for the Court to decide what is sufficient interest in such
c i r cumat.ances v l'" I think both j udges arrived at the right
decision which broadens the law of standing significantly.
In a separate judgement Q'Regan J set out her own reasons finding
that although in this case too, section 7(4) (a) r e qu i r e s
applicants to allege an infringement of or threat to a right
contained in chapter 3, applicants under section 7(4) (b) (v) need
not point to an infringement of or threat to the right of a
particular person. They need to allege that, objectively
speaking, the challenged rule or conduct is in breach of a right
enshrined in ch~pter 3. This flows from the notion of acting in
the public interest. The public will ordinarily have an interest
in the infringement of rights generally, not particularly. 11o
In my view the Ferreira decision is of significance for the
reason that it demonstrates a broad and not a narrow approach to
standing in that it allows prospective applicants to have
standing in cases where it is alleged that a right enshrined in
chapter 3 or any other right that falls beyond chapter 3 has been
infringed or threatened to be infringed. In the past some
restrictions have always been placed on the locus standi of a
complainant. So this, I believe, is a great achievement.
Returning now to the criticisms levelled against Loots by
Glazewski, Loots111 easily justifies he r arguments by out lining
the significance of section 7(4). She argues that the r e a s o n why
109
110
At 99(H-I) - 100 (A) .
At 120H.
111 See Cheryl Loots ~Standing to enforce Fundamental
Rights' SAJHR, (1994) a t 49-50.
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it is important to have such a clause in the Constitution is that
people whose fundamental rights are infringed may not practically
be in a position to approach the court for r elief. The reasons
for this may be that the people affected are unsophisticated and
impecunious, so that they do not know how to go about enforcing
their rights and are not in a financial position to do so. She
also sees fear of judicial process as another barrier that
exacerbates the problem. Most people view litigation as something
emotionally traumatic, time consuming and costly that they are
afraid to get involved in it. As a result, very often large
numbers of people are affected and there is great benefit in one
person or organization being able to approach the court on behalf
of all whose rights are infringed.
3.5 The environmental right
Section 29 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
recognises a fundamental right to a healthy environment. This
section provides that:
IIEvery person shall have the right to an environment that
is not detrimental to his or her health or well-being ll •
On the face of it, the incorporation of an environmental right
in the Bill of Rights represents a milestone in creating an
awareness of and a sensitivity towards the environment. However,
upon closer scrutiny the following criticisms may be levelled
against this environmental right: 112
(i) The content of people's rights is of such a nature that
they cannot be defined properly and are vague in
terminology (e.g What is the content of the words
112 See Tobias van Reenen 'Locus standi in South African
Environmental Law: A Reppraisal in International and Comparative
Perspective' (1995) 2 SAJELP at 142-4.
48
'environment', 'health' and 'well-being'). Since these
rights are vague, they cannot be concretized and the courts
will have difficulty in implementing them. Van Reenen113
argues that "there is therefore a real danger that the
environmental right may become a hollow, ideological
concept which is only included in the Bill to appease even
the most radical 'greens'".
(ii) What legal standards are being established against which
to measure an infringement of the environment? For example,
should a 'healthy environment' comply with the standards
of developing or developed countries, and what will happen
when conflict arises between environmental rights and the
rights of private industry or developers? In these cases
the court will have to balance these competing rights one
against the other before it can give judgement.
(iii) The environmental right is phrased as an anthropocentric
right and forms part of individual human rights in the Bill
of Rights. It therefore centres around the human being (e.g
concern for his health and well-being) and does not protect
the natural environment for its own sake. Such an
environmental right does not cultivate an awareness of
stewardship for the environment, but still clings to the
ethics of utilitarianism.
(iv) The natural environment will not receive the protection it
deserves under the constitution, and will in any event not
receive the same prominence as the entrenched homocentric
environmental rights. Since the expanded locus standi
requirement refers only to basic human rights embodied in
Chapter 3, the action popularis will not broaden the scope
of the protection of natural environment for its own sake.
In short, the bill suffers from significant weaknesses.
113 Van Reenen op cit at 143.
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Glazewski 1 M argues that the South African environmental c lause
embodied in section 29 is negatively phrased, in that it confers
a right to an environment which is 'not detrimental to health
rather than simply a healthy environment'. He suggests that the
effect of this clause is to imply some sort of minimum standard
of environmental quality rather than 'guaranteeing a limitless
and thus unrealistic right to environmental integrity' . 115
Winstanle y 116 shares the same sentiments and her view is that
Section 29 is strange and unsatisfactory.
This negatively phrased clause is also objectionable for its
failure to recognize the importance of protecting the
environment, and of reducing waste and pollution. Furthermore,
its shortcomings include its failure to mention the right to the
wise management of natural resources; and the absence of a duty
on either the state or individuals to conserve the environment
or to minimise waste generation and pollution; and lastly, its
failure to recognise the equal entitlement of future generations
to similar environmental rights. 117 What the clause does is to
require, of course by inference, that the state does not actively
harm individuals ' environment . 118 Fortunately, the drafters of
the Constitution have redrafted this c l a u s e t o make it more
adequate.
It could well be argued that, even if environmental legislation
114 Jan Glazewski 'The Environment and the New In terim
Constitution' (1995) 1 SAJELP at 4 - 6 .
115 . See Jan Glazewski 'The environment and the new Interim
Constitution' (1994) 1 SAJELP 3-7.
116 See Terry Winstanley
Protection in the New Constitution'
'Entrenching Environmental
(1995) 1 SAJELP at 93.
117 Jan Glazewski op cit at 6.
118 This will be in line with the approach taken by other
countries that placed an onus on the state to protect the
environment. (This includes countries like, Brazil, Burkina Faso,
Ethiopia, Colombia, India, The Seychelles and Spain) .
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provides for the protection of the natural environment as such t
the environmental right incorporated in the Bill of Rights will
take precedence. Besides those criticisms levelled against the
environmental right as indicated above t there are certain
advantages attached to the inclusion of an environmental right
in the Bill of Rights:
(i) It could play an educational role in creating better
awareness of the importance of the environment to society
itself.
(ii) It could influence legislation generally and also promote
the promulgation of legislation for the protection of the
environment.
3.6 Limitation of the right
Section 33 of the Constitution deals with the limitation of
rights entrenched in Chapter 3. Environmental rights are t like
other basic r Lqht.s , not absolute and may be limited by government
institutions upon express authorization. However t such
authorization is never unlimited. The environmental right may be
limited by law of general application provided it is reasonable t
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom
and equalitYt and does not negate the essential content of the
right t and furthermore it has to be necessary in the case of some
rights entrenched in Chapter 3 of the constitution. Therefore t
it could well be argued that the entrenchment of these rights
means that any legal rule which restricts free access to the
courts t will be invalid unless the requirements for the
limitation of rights are complied with. 119
In this regard the South African Constitution adopted the
119 See I M Rautenbach 'General Provisions of the South
African Bill of rights' (1995) at 98.
51
approach followed by the Canadian Constitution. In fact the South
African model was drawn from the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. The general limitation in the Canadian Charter states
that, ~The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms set out in it
subject to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society' .120
,
What the Canadian courts did was to develop a two stage approach
in determining the constitutional validity of any law under their
respective instruments. The two stages of enquiry are as follows:
(i) The first stage of inquiry
The first stage of inquiry is whether the right or freedom has
been infringed, breached or denied. If the answer to this
question is in the affirmative, then one will have to move on to
the second stage of inquiry. What the courts will first look at
is the ambit of the fundamental right or freedom and then whether
the law or act complained of interferes with its exercise. The
onus is on the applicant in so far as the first issue is
concerned to demonstrate that a fundamental right or freedom has
been infringed. Therefore, the party invoking the limitations
clause then bears the burden of demonstrating that the
restriction is consonant with the limitations clause. Cachalia
et al 1 2 1 argue that this kind of approach should be adopted in
respect of our Chapter not only because its structure follows
that of the Canadian Charter, but also because it provides a
sensible and logical framework of analysing and employing
comparative foreign case law and jurisprudence in developing our
own law.
(ii) The second stage of the inquiry
The second inquiry stems from the answer to the first inquiry,
120 Section 1.
121 Cachalia et al "Furidemeiit.e l. Rights in the New
Constitution' (1994) at 107.
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that is whether or not the right to freedom has been infringed,
breached or denied. Thus, if the answer to this question is in
the affirmative, then it must, at this stage be determined
whether the restriction is saved by the limitation provisions.
To answer this question one also needs to first look at four
comparative sources for the conceptual structure of our
limi tations clause which are stated as follows: 122
* The first source is the general limitations clause in section
1 of the Canadian Charter which stipulates that the rights and
freedoms contained in the charter are guaranteed 'subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society'
* the second source is to be found in the wording of the
limitation clauses attached to the different rights contained
in the Freedoms which follow a basic formula: 'subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the
protection of public order'.
* The third source is the German Constitution which prevents
judicial and legislative or executive collusion in subverting
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution by
limiting them out of existence. Article 19.2 of the Basic Law
provides that the 'essential content' of the rights may not be
violated.
* The fourth source is the concept drawn from the US
jurisprudence that the limitations on certain rights ought to
be more strictly scrutinized and others less so.
The authors have argued that notwithstanding the fact that the
drafters of this clause have drawn from these different sources
and that there is much to learn from the rich jurisprudence
122 Cachalia op cit at 109.
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developed by the courts in the different jurisdictions, a word
of caution concerning the use of comparative authority should be
uttered. 1 2 3 That is to say that the court should only use the
kind of authority that is best for our country.
One interesting point to be noted from the limitation clause is
that it specifically subj ects the common law to the rights
contained in the chapter and renders any common-law limitation
on such rights unconstitutional unless the limitation conforms
wi th the requirements of section 33 (1) .124 However, section
33(3) recognize common law rights other than those contained in
the chapter 'to the extent that they are not inconsistent with
this Chapter I This clause is boosted by section 35 (3) which
enjoins the courts to have 'due regard to the spirit, purport and
obj ects' of the chapter when interpreting, applying or developing
common law and customary law.
The inclusion of an 'environmental right I and 'locus standi
clause' in the Bill of Rights admittedly represents victory form
the point of view of environmentalists who have waited for many
years to see this happening before the beginning of the 21st
century. In my view, the challenge that lies ahead is to measure
the success of the Bill of Rights by looking at how those rights
enshrined in the Bill of Rights have fared in the courts so far.
In this regard one needs to look at the few recent environmental
cases that were decided by our courts to date.
3.7 Recent Cases
The case of Van Huysteen and Others v The Minister of
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few recent cases that deals with locus standi in terms of Section
7(4) (b) (i) of the Interim Constitution. The case arose in the
context of a proposed erection of a steel mill on a farm portion
located in close proximity to the West Coast National Park and
the wetlands at the Langebaan Lagoon which are protected under
the Conservation of Wetlands of International Importance
especially as Water Fowl Habitat . 126 The Sixth1 2 7 and
Seventh1 2 8 respondents had applied to the Provincial
Administration of the Western Cape for the rezoning of the land
under the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (C). Erf 2121
Langebaan was situated opposite the lagoon and was owned by the
W Trust, the trustees of which were the three applicants. The
Fourth applicant was joined in his personal capacity as a
beneficiary under the Wittedrift Trust. The Trustees were
desirous of building a holiday home or a permanent home on the
trust property.
The question that the court had to decide was whether the
applicants had locus standi to claim an order requiring second
(the Premier of the Western Cape Province) and third respondents
(the Minister of Agriculture, Planning and Tourism) to refrain
from deciding the rezoning application before the board appointed
in terms of s 15 has finalised its investigation.
Counsel for the sixth and seventh respondents raised an objection
of a lack of locus standi. Relying on Jacobs en 'n Ander v Waks
en Andere1 2 9 he contended that applicants had to show that they
had a direct interest in the relief sought and that they had not
done so. He contended further relying on the same case, that a
1 2 6 The Lagoon's wetlands were protected in terms of the
Convention on Wet lands of International Importance to which South
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person asking for relief cannot lay claim to locus standi if his
interest in the case is no more and no less than the interest
which all citizens have therein.
In view of the aforementioned arguments, one also needs, I
believe, to look at the basis on which the sixth and seventh
respondents opposed the interdict sought against the second and
third respondents (it being common cause that the granting of
such an interdict would adversely affect the sixth and seventh
respondents). The following grounds can be identified: 13 o
(a) that the order sought amounts to a final interdict which
should not be granted because:
(i) applicants do not have locus standi;
(ii) they have not shown that they have any right which is
being infringed;
(iii) even if they have shown such a right, they have not shown
any infringement thereof; and
(iv) even if they have shown all the aforegoing, they have an
alternative remedy;
In developing this submission the respondent's counsel referred
to the fact that, although the papers reveal that the trust
property was situated at Meeuklip, Langebaan, right opposite the
lagoon, there is no indication as to how far it is from the
proposed development. He pointed to the fact that there was no
evidence before the Court that the trust property was in the area
for which the structure plan was approved and said that prima
facie it did not fall in that area. Clearly, so he contended,
areas of Vredenburg-Saldanha on the one hand and Langebaan on the
other are not in the same municipal area. In the light of these
considerations, he submitted, the applicants have not succeeded
in showing that they have the necessary locus standi to bring the
application.
130 At 289 C-F.
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In this regard counsel for t he applicants submitted that the
arguments put forward by the respondent's counsel, for example,
that the applicants lack standing were refuted by the provisions
of s 7(4) (b) of the Constitution, which evinced a clear intention
to put an end to the previous restrictive approach to locus
standi adopted by our courts. He submitted further that, apart
from the fact that Mr Van Huysteen in his capacity is before the
Court as fourth applicant, a purposive approach to interpreting
s 7(4) (b) would lead to the conclusion that trustees suing on
behalf of the trust would clearly be regarded as falling within
the meaning of s 7(4) (b).
He went further to argue that the constitution had adopted and
entrenched a very liberalised notion of legal standing to an
extent that the 'own interest I referred to in s 7 (4) (b) (i) is
wide enough to cover an interest as trustee. In that sense, this
'more generous approach to legal standing' is applicable, as s
7(4) makes clear, in all cases where an infringement of or a
threat to any right entrenched in chapter 3 of the constitution
is alleged. 13 1
In this regard the court held that the first, second and third
applicants had locus standi, as their rights as trustees in
respect of the trust property would be affected or threatened.
This was because it was clear f r om the papers that if the views
of those experts who were of the opinion that the erection and
operation of a steel mill would detrimentally affect the lagoon
and its sensitive ecosystem are correct and the views of the
experts who take a different view are conclusively refuted before
the board, the value of the trust property, which is just
opposite the lagoon, must of necessity be diminished by
industrial activity which pollutes or otherwise detrimentally
affects the natural beauty and enjoyment associated with being
131 See J R L Milton et al in the chapter on 'Procedural
Rights' in Van Wyk et al (eds) 'Rights and Constitutionalism the. 'new South Afrlcan Order' at 421.
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near to the lagoon.
The Court further held that the fourth applicant, in his personal
capacity, will be affected in his interest as a beneficiary
entitled to use and occupy the trust property and the benefits
associated with such use and occupation which clearly include
those flowing from its proximity to the lagoon. Lastly, the court
held that .... own interest' referred to in section 7 (4) (b) (i) of the
Interim Constitution is wide enough to cover an interest as
trustee.
It is submitted, in conclusion, that the Van Huysteen's case has
set a good precedent in the law of standing after the coming into
effect of the Bill of Rights in South Africa. In this case the
court has interpreted the standing requirement very broadly as
envisaged by Section 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa which entrenched a very liberalized notion of legal
standing. As discussed above, this more generous approach to
legal standing will greatly facilitate the enforcement of rights
on behalf of those persons who are perhaps ignorant of their
rights or do not have the capacity, financial or otherwise, to
bring an action on their own. 13 2
Another recent case that adopted a more flexible approach to the
problem of standing is the landmark case of Wildlife Society of
Southern Africa and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs
and Tourism of the Republic of South Africa and Others1 3 3 • In
this case the applicants (the Wildlife Society, the Conservation
Director thereof and two occupiers of cottages on the Transkei
Wild Coast) sought an order against the respondents with regard
to the grant of rights of occupation and the allocation of sites
within the Transkei coastal conservation area to private
132 See JRL Milton et a I , in a chapter on .... Procedural
Rights' in Van Wyk et al (eds) Rights and Constitutionalism, The
New South African Order at 421.
1 3 3
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individuals and the construction of structures on such sites
which resulted in the environmental degradation of the area.
The application was brought in terms of section 39 of Transkei
Decree No. 9 (Environmental Conservation) which established a
coastal conservation area on the entire length of the sea-shore
and placed restrictions on development and building within that
area. The respondents opposed the application and one of the
issues they raised was the applicants' lack of locus standi.
Although the first respondent had raised the issue of the locus
standi of the applicants, his counsel had conceded in his heads
of argument that the Applicants had locus standi on the basis of
section 7(4) (b) read with section 29 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa Act 2 00 of 1993. 1 3 4 In my view, I think
the respondent's counsel was right in giving this concession by
virtue of the provisions of s 7(4) (b) of the Constitution which
evinced a clear intention to put an end to the previous
restrictive approach to locus standi adopted by the courts.
The Court noted that even in circumstances where the locus standi
afforded to persons by section 7 of the interim Constitution was
not applicable and where a statute imposed an obligation upon the
State to take certain measures ln order to protect the
environment in the interests of the public, a body such as the
First Applicant whose main object was to promote environmental
conservation in South Africa should have locus standi at common
law to apply for an order compelling the State to comply with its
obligations in terms of such statute. The Court held that to
afford locus standi to a body such as the First Applicant ln
circumstances such as the present case would not open the
floodgates to a torrent of frivolous or vexatious litigation
against the state by cranks or busybodies. 135 This was a
134
135
Herein referred to as "the interim Constitution".
At 473d-e .
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response to the principal objection raised against the adoption
of a more flexible approach to the problem of locus standi, that
the floodgates will thereby be open giving rise to an
uncontrollable torrent of litigation. In this regard the court
took into account a remark made by Mr Justice Kirby, President
of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, in the course of an
address at the Tenth Anniversary Conference of the Legal
Resources Centre, namely, that it may sometimes be necessary to
open the floodgates in order to irrigate the arid ground below
them.
In delivering this judgment, Pickering J was persuaded, not only
by the decision in Van Huysteen's case, but was also moved by the
decisions in R v Inland Revenue Commissioners: Ex parte National
Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd13 6 and Re v
Inspectorate of Pollution, Ex parte Greenpeace. 13 7 In the first
case Lord Diplock stated that there would be 'a grave lacuna in
our system of law if a pressure group or even a single public-
spirited taxpayer, were prevented by outdated technical rules of
locus standi from bringing the matter to the attention of the
court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct
stopped I .138
In the second case (R v Inspectorate of pollution, Ex parte
Greenpeace) the Court upheld the locus standi of the Greenpeace
organisation 'who, with its particular experience in
environmental matters, its access to experts in relevant realms
of science, technology and law is able to mount a carefully
selected, focused, relevant and well-argued challenge I .139 Of
particular relevance is the judgement of Otton J who stated that
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might not have an effective way to bring the issues before the
court. There would have to be an application either by an
individual employee or a near neighbour. In this case it is
unlikely that either would be able to command the expertise which
is at the disposal of Greenpeace. Consequently, a less well-
informed challenge might be mounted which would stretch
unnecessarily the court~s resources and which would not afford
the court the assistance it requires in order to do justice
between the parties. I
The Court also considered the sentiments of the late Professor
Van Niekerk1 4 0 • He was of the view that the most obvious
solution to the problem of locus standi was "to regard the
environment as being peculiarly of interest to every member of
society' and he continued by saying that, because the effect of
the environmental blight will not spare any member of society in
the final analysis, it did not seem misplaced in terms of
existing legal principles to give every member of society the
right to protect what amounts to his own interest. An adoption
of this line of reasoning will not erode the basic principle of
our law on which locus standi to sue is based namely ~that no
man can sue in respect of a wrongful act, unless it constitutes
the breach of a duty owed to him by the wrong-doer, or unless it
causes him some damage in law' .
In my view, both the Wildlife Society v Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism and Van Huysteen cases should be welcome from
an environmental perspective, for they adopted a more flexible
approach to the problem of locus standi, another tentative step
towards the total liberation of the locus standi requirement. I
must point out that the inclusion of the "environmental right"
in the constitution is a positive step towards environmental law
reform in South Africa. Unfortunately, the environmental right
provided for in Section 29 is phrased in an anthropocentric
140 Van Niekerk ~The Ecological Norm in Law or the
Jurisprudence of the Fight Against Pollution' 1975 SALJ 78.
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fashion, and is without fixed content and therefore open to many
interpretations. This approach does not promote stewardship of
the environment and the impact of conservation of the natural
environment is lost. 141
From an environmental perspective, the most positive aspect of
the new Constitution is that the Bill of Rights will afford the
Constitutional Court the opportunity to develop a body of case
law around environmental issues. 14 2 The interpretation of the
environmental right by the Constitutional Court is therefore a
crucial issue and its decision may have far-reaching consequences
for the recognition and implementation of the environmental right
and the locus standi requirement.
In following the spirit of the Constitution, the courts will have
to follow a contextual (purposive) interpretation and devise
guidelines and mechanisms to determine the scope for the locus
standi requirement. Acknowledging the current political and
socio-economic situation, one realises that anthropocentric
actions such as social upl iftment and nation-building will
receive priority on the Constitution.
It is submitted, in conclusion, that lawyers in all spheres of
judicial activity are now faced with a great challenge to take
up the tools given by the constitution and fashion an acceptable
environment for all South African people, a view shared by
Glazewski .143 From an environmental law perspective, the
challenge that faces our c ou r t s is to consider foreign
jurisprudence with a view to shape our environmental law an order
to enable us to meet the challenges of the 21st century. It is
submitted that the use of foreign jurisprudence could also
enhance our constitutional environmental provisions.
14 1 Winstanley op cit 85-97.
142 See Jan Glazewski 'The Environment and the New Interim
Constitution' (1994) 1 SAJELP at 16.
143. Glazewski op cit 16.
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4. LOCUS STANDI UNDER THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA ACT 108 OF 1996.
A closer analysis of the constitutional provisions enumerated in
the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200
of 1993 (the Bill of Rights) reveals that the Constitution leaves
much to be desired. Despite the fact that it has entrenched
certain key rights relating to environmental litigation, the Bill
suffers from significant weaknesses. ' However, as Mureinik1 4 4
puts it, it must be acknowledged that ~the point of the Bill of
Rights is to foster a culture of justification' . That idea offers
both a standard against which to evaluate Chapter 3 of the
interim Constitution and a resource with which to resolve the
interpretative questions that it raises. It is also a powerful
guide for answering the ques tions of interpretation that it
generates. It is submitted that if the courts use that guide
properly, they can overcome most of the deficiencies in the Bill,
and make it a potent weapon for bringing about democracy.
Now, the greatest challenge facing lawyers and academics is to
examine the extent to which the New Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 addresses the deficiencies of the
Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of
1993.
4.1 The Environmental Right
The environmental right appears ln section 24 of the Constitution
and reads as follows:
Everyone has a right-
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or
144 E Mureinik ~A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim
Bill of Rights' SAJHR 1994(1) AT 48.
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well-being; and
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present





prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
promote conservation; and
secure ecologically sustainable development and use of
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic
and social development.
Once again, the wording of the right in the final text is
disappointing for a number of reasons. It is submitted that the
text is strangely formulated and falls short of expectations
wi thin the country, especially the expectations of those who
objected to the formulation of the environmental right in the
Interim Constitution. The right has almost the same wording as
in the draft final Constitution, except that there is an addition
of the reference to the benefit of present and future
generations, and the addition of the phrase 'while promoting
justifiable economic and social benefit' something which the
Interim Constitution failed to recognise.~5
It 1S submitted that the wording of the right 1n the final text
is obj ectionable for the following reasons: 146
* despite calls amongst environmentalists and academics including
Jan Glazewski147, Peter Glavovic148 and Cowen149 to the
145 See Environmental law Monitor 'The Release of the Connep
Discussion Document: Another Tentative Step Towards Environmental
Law Reform in South Africa' Volume 1 Issue 1 June 1996 at 2.
\
146 Environmental Law Monitor op cit at 2.
147 Jan Glazewski 'The environment, human rights and a new
South African Constitution' (1991) 7 SAJHR 167.
148. Peter Glavovic 'Human Rights, and Environmental Law: The
Case for a Bill of Rights' 1988 CILSA 52.
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drafters of the Constitution that the environmental right
clause be positively phrased r the right is still phrased
negatively. 150
* There is nothing in the wording of the right which ensures that
the right will operate horizontally. This could have been done
by including an environmental duty in the final text. As such r
no duties are imposed on the State or people to protect the
environment and to reduce waste and pollution.
* The list in b(i) to (iii) lacks comprehensiveness and
therefore r runs the risk of falling foul of the expressio unius
est exclusio alterius rule of statutory interpretation. The
list is vague for the following reasons:
(i) There is uncertainty as to the meaning of 'ecological
degradation'
(ii) the list emphasises the importance of promoting
conservation without specifying exactly what needs to be
conserved.
(iii) The inclusion of the part on the use of legislative
measures aimed at securing ecologically sustainable
development r etc r to promote justifiable economic and
social development does not appear to be feasible and
realistic. The drafters of this clause seem to have failed
to give much thought on this issue and it is feared that
this may lead to problems in future interpretation of the
right. 1 5 1
149 D V Cowen 'Towards some distinctive principles of South
African law: Jurisprudential perspectives and a role for
legislation' (1989) 52 THRHR 3.
150
151
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After landing this major assault on the 'environmental right' in
the new constitution, the ELA, together with some other
organisations, made representations to the Constitutional
Assembly concerning the environmental right. However, nothing
seems to have come out of this.
4.2 Application and Interpretation
Section 8 of the Constitution provides that, (1) the Bill of
Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the
executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state; (2) a
provision of the Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic
persons if and to the extent that it is applicable, taking into
account the nature of the right and of any duty imposed by the
right; (3) further, that in applying the provisions of the Bill
of Rights to natural and juristic persons in terms of subsection
(2), a court-
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply
or, where necessary, develop the common law to the extent
that legislation does not give effect to that right; and
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right,
provided that the limitation is in accordance with section
36 (1) (the Limitation Clause); and
(4) that juristic persons are entitled to the rights in the Bill
of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the rights
and of the juristic persons.
By contrast, this section differs materially from Section 7 of
the Interim Constitution in that it includes the 'enforcement of
right' clause, an extension of section 7(4) of Chapter 3 of the
Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of
1993. It is submitted that the practical effect of the
environmental right in any given situation will depend to a large
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extent on the applicability of the Bill of Rights. 152
4.3 Enforcement of Rights
The framers of the New Constitution have moved in the right
direction by including a separate section that deals with the
enforcement of rights enshrined in the Constitution. In my view,
this kind of enactment should be welcome. Section 38 of the
Constitution provides that,
'Anyone listed in the bill of rights has the right to
approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the
Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the
court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration
of rights'.
The persons who may approach a court are-
(a) anyone acting in their own interest;
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act
in their own name;
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a
group or class of persons;
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members.
The effect of section 38 is that any person or organization may
enforce the rights contained in the Bill of Rights, irrespective
of whether that person or organization is adversely affected by
the alleged infringement of rights. This is also envisaged by
Section 7(4) of Chapter 3 of the interim constitution.
152 See Winstanley op cit at 88.
67
4.4 The significance of section 38
The significance of section 38 in the Constitution is that people
whose fundamental rights are infringed may not practicably be in
a position to approach the court for relief. It is submitted that
very often large numbers of people are affected and there is
great benefit in one person or organization being able to
approach the court on behalf of all whose rights are infringed.
Returning now to the question that seeks an answer as to the
extent to which the New Constitution of 1996 addresses the
deficiencies of the Interim Constitution, it appears to me that
there are no major changes in the new constitution. One would
have thought that the framers of the new constitution would take
the obj ections of the ELA and other parties seriously when
redrafting the Constitution. To everyone's surprise, and to the
environmentalists in particular, this was not the case. As a
result this failure renders t he redrafting process a dismal
failure, especially from an environmental perspective. However,
it is submitted that the extent to which the environmental right
clause will be useful in environmental cases will depend upon how
widely the court interprets it.
So far, our courts have heard very few environmental related
cases where constitutional provisions were used challenging a
particular course of action. Therefore, at this stage it is
difficult to measure the success of the constitution (s ) in
resolving environmental related disputes. However, the two cases
of Van Huysteen and Others v The Minister of Environmental
Affairs and Tourism and Others1 5 3 and Wildlife Society v
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Touxi ear'" serve as' good
precedents for parties who seek to use the constitution to
enforce rights contained in the constitution that they do not
153
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have to prove any infringement of rights. Therefore, any person
can champion an action In terms of section 38 of the New
Constitution to vindicate a public interest without proving any
special interest or infringement of his/her rights protected by
the Constitution.
The greatest challenge facing the S9£stitutional Court in South
Africa today is to develop cases t6 shape our environmental law.
As the threats to our environment increase the need to use the
law to protect the environment becomes more critical. Therefore,
our courts should start to take environmental rights seriously.
However, in order to make this dream a success, the Constitution
should impose duties upon the State and its citizenry to protect
and care for the environment.
There is no doubt that the Constitution has broadened the locus
standi requirement significantly especially in view of the
liberal decision of the Constitutional Court in Ferreira v
Levirr"", The question is whether there is a need to liberate
the standing requirement any further. In my view, one needs to
look at some foreign jurisprudence in order to explore how other
countries tackle the problem of standing in their jurisdictions.
The main object is to find out if we could learn something from
those countries that we can use to modify our own law. In my
view, we can use foreign jurisprudence as a model to guide us in
the future development of our environmental law.
1 5 5 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 99.
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5. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE LEGAL STANDING OF ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSOCIATIONS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES
The problem of standing with respect to public interest
litigation is universal and therefore not unique to South African
law. The rule requiring an interest in the litigation applies in
most legal systems. One important issue that I picked up from the
Constitution, which of course needs further analysis, is the
provision that "in interpreting the provisions of this Chapter
a court shall where applicable, have regard to public
international law applicable to the protection of the rights
entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to comparable
foreign case law". 156 A look at the position i n a few foreign
legal systems may therefore help us identify lessons that those
countries may have for South Africa . 157
With some few exceptions many countries both inside and outside
Europe have always adopted a narrow approach to standing. I have
identified the following countries as some of the few countries
whose standing requirements are broad enough to open up access
to environmental justice (these are the countries which South
Africa can learn a lot from since their approach to standing is
much wider) :
5.1 India
Legal systems in different parts of the world often demonstrate
attachment to similar doctrinal tools. The rule requiring an
interest in the litigation applies in most legal systems. This
is particularly evident within the law of standing in India. The
156 Section 35 of the Interim Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
157 See Tobias P van Reenen 'Locus Standi in South African
Environmental Law: A Reppraisal in the International and
Comparative Perspective (1995) 2 SAJELP at 132-3.
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case of Charnj it Ltd v Union of India1 5 8 is a good example for
this view. In this case the Court held that no one except those
whose rights were affected by a law could raise the question of
the constitutionality of that law. It therefore comes as no
surprise that the early jurisprudence of the Indian Supreme Court
evinced such an attachment to the private rights view of standing
which has exercised a similar hold on Anglo-American thought.
The narrow approach to standing has been justified further by
floodgate arguments and the unwillingness or inability of the
courts to adjudicate on matters that are best left to the
discretion of policy makers, attorneys general, and other so-
called guardians of the public interest. The Indian Supreme
Court, having anticipated later innovations, declared in 1976
that, 'where a wrong against community interest is done, no
locus standi' will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested
public body chasing the wrongdoer in court. Since that time the
Indian approach to public interest litigation has extended the
rules of standing to the point that they may be said to have
ceased to present any real obstacle to the public interest
litigant.
The widening up of standing requirements in India has opened up
access to the courts at least as widely as the South African
Constitution has done .159 This has enabled organisations and
individuals to bring applications before the Indian Supreme
Court.
The case of Gupta v Union of India1 6 0 provides a classic
justification of the Indian approach to public interest
litigation. In this case, which involved the judges themselves,
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comprehensive revision of the law of standing. The case entails
a number of different challenges to governmental action which
involved the judiciary. Of particular relevance are two central
issues which form the basis of this action.
First, the Minister of Law had decided to implement a policy
under which only a certain percentage of the judges who sat
within a particular area came from that area. The objective was
to combat the narrow, parochial tendencies which could exist if
the judiciary all came from the same geographical area. To
achieve this end, the Minister sent a circular to the chief
ministers of the representative Indian states asking them to
secure the consent of the judges who worked within their state
asking them to an appointment elsewhere should that be necessary.
The Bombay Bar Association and Law Society challenged the
circular on the basis that it constitutes an unconstitutional
attack upon the independence of the judiciary.161
A second claim assailed the government policy of making short-
term judicial appointments as a further attack on judicial
independence, and sought a mandamus to compel the government to
convert these judicial appointments into permanent posts. A
preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Union of India.
It was argued that the petitioners had not suffered any legal
injury by, for example, the making of short-term appointments.
Legal injury, if any, was caused to the additional judges whose
consent was sought. No third party could enforce the rights of
others. 162
The leading opinion on this issue was delivered by Bhagwanti J
who reasoned that:
161 See P P Graig and S L Deshpande 'Righ ts I Au tonomy and
Process: Public Interest Litigation in India' Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies vol.9 at 359.
162. Ibid.
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"It may now be taken as well established that where a legal
wrong or legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate
class of persons by reasons of violation of any constitutional
or legal right or any burden is imposed in contravention of any
constitutional or legal provision or without authority of law
or any such legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is
threatened and such person or determinate class of persons is
by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially
or economically disadvantaged position unable to approach the
Court for relief, any member of the public can maintain an
action for an appropriate direction, order or writ ... "
In delivering the judgement of the court, Bhagwati J referred to
traditional rules of locus standi under which judicial redress
would only be available to those who had suffered a violation of
a legal right or legally protected interest by the action of the
state. Breach of such a legal right was a condition precedent for
invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, and the protection of
personal or proprietary interests narrowly so defined provided
the central judicial theme. However, he observed that this
approach arose in an era when private law dominated the legal
scene and public law had not yet been born.
The honourable Judge went on to say that standing had to be
liberalized because the very purpose of the law itself was
undergoing a transformation. It was being used to foster social
justice by creating new categories of rights in favour of large
sections of the people, with correspondingly novel duties imposed
upon the state. Individual rights were being supplemented by
social rights; the former were 'practically meaningless in
today's setting unless accompanied by the social rights necessary
to make them effective and really accessible to all'.
Furthermore, he expressed the view that, in modern society
individual action could cause prejudice to large numbers, and
could impair the advancement of the goals contained in 'Directive
Principles of State Policy I. Thus the illegal discharge of
effluent into a river, the invalid raising of bus fares, or the
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forbidden release of noxious fumes should all be viewed as
examples of injury to the public generally. As a result, any
member of the public who has sufficient interest can maintain an
action for the violation of a constitutional or other legal
provision which causes public injury. Bhagwati J also
acknowledged that there can be cases where there is both public
injury arising from an illegal act, and a specific legal injury
to an individual or group of individuals.
The most important point that emerges from the reasoning of
Bhagwati J is the strong reaffirmation that standing should be
construed broadly. It reinforces the notion that whenever a
person or class of persons whose legal rights are violated is
unable to approach the Court for redress due to poverty,
disability or because of their socially disadvantaged position,
any member of the public acting bona fide could move the Court
for relief under Article 32.
The evolution of public interest litigation in India as a
specific procedure designed to cater for the "common man", has
also extended the range of people whose interests are represented
in court. The Indian Constitution, in particular, has widened
access to environmental justice quite remarkably. The
environmental clauses in the Indian Constitution are contained
an a specific part of the Constitution entitled ' Di r e c t i v e
Principles of State Policy I. These Principles are devoted to
economic and social rights or third generation rights. By way of
contrast, these principles are clearly set apart from that part
of the Constitution devoted to fundamental rights which embodies
the traditional civil and political or first generation rights.
The Indian Supreme Court has relied on the environmental clauses
to justify certain decisions in cases which have come before it.
The case of Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corpora t.i.oir'? t is a
pertinent illustration of the role which third generation rights
16 3 Gp cit note 95 at 51.
74
provided for in a constitution, can have in judicial proceedings.
Locus standi was given to the petitioners who were pavement and
slum dwellers in the city of Bombay. They . had been forcibly
evicted and their pavement and slum dwellings had been demolished
by the respondents, the Bombay Corporation. They relied on, inter
alia, Article 21 of the Indian Constitution which provides a
fundamental right that:
'No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to the procedure established by law' .
The petitioners argued that their 'fundamental right to life' had
been infringed and that the procedure established under the
Act 1 64 which the corporation had acted under, was unfair. They
also pointed out that they chose to live there because it
afforded them better work opportunities than elsewhere in the
region.
The question which the court had to decide was whether the
fundamental 'right to life' conferred by Article 21 included the
'right to livelihood' . The court answered this question in the
affirmative. In deciding this question the court relied on
certain directive principles in the Constitution. In particular
it relied on a specific Article which provides that the state
shall make an effective provision for securing the right to work
'within the limits of its economic capacity'. The court used
these directive principles to come to the petitioners' aid.
In a recent decision in Metha v The Union of India 1 6 5 an action
was brought by the petitioner under Article 32 of the
Constitution as public interest litigation in respect of
pollution of the Ganges river by the uncontrolled and untreated
effluent discharged by leather tanneries located on its banks.
164
1 65
The Municipal Corporation Act, 1988.
1987 (4) SCC 463.
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The discharge of this effluent from the tanneries adjacent to the
river was of particular concern because it was ten times more
noxious than household sewage. The Supreme Court was called upon
to enforce the provisions of the Water (Prevention and Control
of Pollution) Act of 1974 and the Environmental Protection Act
of 1986.
The petitioner was not himself a riparian owner, but an active
social worker who was concerned with protecting the lives and
health of those who used the Ganges River. The Supreme Court
ordered several tanneries to install water treatment plants or
to stop production if they were unable to do so. As a result, the
court took the far-reaching step of closing those tanneries which
had ignored previous notices to take elementary steps for the
treatment of industrial effluent. The court, relying on the
environmental provisions in the constitution, held that ~closure
of tanneries may bring unemployment, loss of revenue, but life,
health and ecology have greater importance to the people'
In delivering its judgement the court took into account Article
21 of the constitution which protects life and liberty and then
linked it with Articles 48A and 51A which make provision for the
protection of the environment. The court held that the pollution
of a river to the extent that its waters become dangerous to use
does threaten life. Furthermore, the provision of clean water is
certainly a contingent public good, and may even under certain
circumstances be a collective good. Therefore, the cleanliness
of the Ganges river can in that sense be regarded as a public
good. The Ganges is the holy river of India; it is the purifier
for all those within society. To alter the distribution of its
benefits in such a way as to render them subject to control,
other than by each potential beneficiary controlling his share
of those benefits, would be to alter the very benefit of that
society.
The Indian Supreme Court also invoked the Directive Principles
in the case of Kinkri Devi v Sta te of Himachal Pradesh where
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locus . standi was accorded to the petitioners who sought an order
that a mining lease for the excavation of limestone granted by
first respondent (the State of Himachal Pradesh) to third
respondent be cancelled. The petitioners alleged t hat the mining
activity posed a threat to adjoining lands, water resources,
pastures, forests, wildlife, ecology and the environment
generally. It comes as no surprise that the court noted the need
for industrial growth and development but held that this must be
from the point of view ~of its impact on the ecology'. The court
went on to order the respondents to file a report by a return day
as to the environmental effects of the mining activity. In
justifying its decision, the court held that there is both a
constitutional duty of the citizen not only to protect, but also
to improve the environment and to p reserve and safeguard the
forests, the flora and the fauna, the rivers and lakes and all
other water resources of the country.
The Indian cases discussed above reveal that the Indian Supreme
Court has long moved away from the narrow approach to standing
despite the floodgates arguments advanced by the proponents of
the restrictive approach to standing . A similar kind of approach
was followed by the United States Supreme Court which has also
broadened the narrow scope of standing as shown in the few cases
that will be the subj ect of discussion be low. 1 6 6
5.2 United States
Until very recently, standing to sue lurked as the major obstacle
to citizen groups seeking to protect environmental interests.
Traditionally both the South African and the American l a w
required the private applicant for judicial review to show that
166 See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v FPC 35 4 F. 2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965); Citizen Committee for the Hudson Valley v
Volpe 302, F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Road Review League v
Boyd 270 F . Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); and Association of Data
Processing Service Organisations, Inc v Camp 397 US 150 (1970).
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the illegal administrative action that harms the environment also
infringes his subjective right. As a result, the requirement that
the applicant himself or herself must suffer harm over and above
that suffered by the public at large (i.e, that he should have
suffered some personal injury as a result of the illegal act) has
led to the condonation of the illegal action of the
administrative agency by the court. However, over the past few
decades the American law, and of recent, the South African law
have witnessed a dramatic liberalisation of the locus standi
requirement.
In the United States attention has been turned towards the
citizen action to serve as a tool in controlling administrative
agencies and in aiding the enforcement of environmental
legislation. This trend came after much criticism levelled
against administrative agencies in the environmental field. It
came to be recognised that allowing the citizen to sue in the
public interest would serve as an important check on
administrative action. Moreover, it was recognised that one of
the best devices for providing scrutiny of administrative action
is to allow the citizen to keep a watchful eye on every
administrative action. The rationale behind this view is that in
most instances it is the citizen himself or herself who will
suffer if administrative environmental action is inadequate. 1 6 7
In order to broaden the scope of public interest litigation quite
substantially, the United States federal courts have read public
environmental rights into statutes because of a tacit
acknowledgement of a fundamental public right to a decent
environment underlying the statutes. 1 6 8 The following cases
illustrate the willingness of federal courts to read
1 6 7 See Andre Rabie and Cor Eckard 'Locus standi: the
administration's shield and the environmentalist's shackle' CILSA
IX 1976 at 145-6.
168 . See John Pearson 'Toward a Consti tutionally Protected
Environment' 1971 Environment LR 53 at 62-68.
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environmental criteria into statutes having little or nothing to
do with the environment and further show that courts implicitly
recognize an underlying public interest in preserving the
environment.
The first example is furnished by the judicial
section 13 of the Rivers and Harbours Act of
treatment of
1899. 1 6 9 The
purpose of
navigation. 17 0
section 13 was to prohibit





spillage of oil directly upon navigable waters violated section
13, even though navigation was not obstructed. Without
considering whether navigation was obstructed, the Supreme Court,
in 1966 in the case of United States v Standard Oil Compenyt?"
held that aviation gasoline, although commercially valuable
before its accidental discharge into a river, was 11refuse 11 within
the meaning of section 13. What is worth noting in this case is
that the Court read the statute 11broadly 11 because of its own
concern, not because of a prior mandate.
Similarly, the courts have read environmental considerations into
section 10 of the Rivers and Harbours Act l 72 which entitled
"0bstruction of Navigable Waters Generally". This Section
provides that no such obstructions may be erected except upon
recommendation of the Chief of Engineers and authorization by the
Secretary of the Army. The statute itself does not appear to be
specific on the guidelines for granting or withholding
authorization, however, the secretary1s primary, if not only,
169 33 D.S.C. S 407 1964.
17 0 The essential purpose of Section 13 was to prevent the
introduction into navigable channels of the only kind of material
which had given trouble to navigation up to that time, i.e, such
material as would form an actual physical obstruction to
navigation. (This Act was published long before the serious
pollution of navigable waters had occurred or was anticipated)
1 71
1 72
384 D.S. 224 (1966).
33 D.S. 352 (1964).
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criterion would appear to be t he proposed obstruction's effect
on navigation. The Supreme Court, in the case of United States
ex rel. Grea thouse v Dern, l 73 upheld the Secretary's refusal to
authorize construction of a wharf for reasons unrelated to
navigation and arguably connected with conservation.
Likewise, in the case of United States v Ray, 174 a federal
district court , whose concern appeared to be exclusively
environmental, upheld the Secretary's decision restricting a
developer from constructing a fill in the vicinity of coral reef
on the edge of the continental shelf. In this case navigability
was not a problem because only small boats travelled the waters.
Rather, the court enjoined the project for fear that it would
destroy a "natural wonderland" habituated by rare species of
fish, thereby implying the existence of a public right to the
preservation of the reef's ecology.
The last case that also deals with the statutory construction and
public environmental rights, is that of Scenic Hudson
Preserva tion Conference v FPC1 7 5 which happens to be a landmark
in the area of standing to sue. In this case, the FPC had
licensed Consolidated Edison's proposed Hydroelectric project at
Storm King Mountain, which overlooked the Hudson River.
Petitioners, including two conservation groups, contended that
the FPC failed to consider relevant conservation factors before
issuing the license. Consolidated Edison asserted that the
conservation organisations lacked standing because the project
would not injure them. The court held that allowing i nterested
groups to sue was necessary ~to insure that the Federal Power
Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the
aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of power




289 D.S. 352 (1933).
281 F. SUpp. 876 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965)
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to consider alternative methods of providing power to the New
York City.
Another interesting point is the broadening of the Sceni c Hudson
theory in Ci tizen Corruni ttee for the Hudson Valley v vol.pe:"
where the court held that the rule is that, if the statutes
involved in the controversy are concerned with the protection of
natural and scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists
to give standing to groups interested in these factors and who
allege that these factors are not being properly considered by
the agency. Similarly, in Environmental Defence Fund v
Hsrditiq i? ' ? the plaintiffs, a number of conservation societies,
were also allowed standing although they suffered no personal
injury.
For the first time in the history of the United States the court
in the famous case of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v FPC
clearly departed from the traditional notions of standing by
ruling that a group of persons which has shown a special interest
in the environmental aspects of (power) development, even though
lacking any personal economic interest, may have standing to
challenge an administrative decision affecting the environment.
The Scenic Hudson approach to standing was further broadened in
the case of Ci tizens Corruni ttee for the Hudson Valley v Volpe
where the court ruled that 'the rule is that if the statutes
involved in the controversy are concerned with the protection of
the natural and scenic resources, then a congressional intent
exists to give standing to groups interested in these factors and
who allege that these factors are not being properly c on s i d e r e d
by the agency'. Relying on the Scenic Hudson precedent the court
decided that the plaintiff's public interest in the resources and




302, F. Supp . 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
428 F 2d 1093 (DC Cir 1970) .
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The Scenic Hudson doctrine wa s. further extended in the two
subsequent cases of Road Review League v Boyd17 8 and Associa tion
of Data Processing Service Organisations, Inc v Camp 1 7 9 quite
significantly. In the first case, the point in issue was a
determination by the Federal Bureau of Roads of the route of an
interstate highway. Plaintiffs (a town, a community civic
association, two wildlife sanctuaries whose property would have
been adversely affected by the proposed highway, certain
individuals whose property would have been taken for the road and
the Road Review League, a non-profit organisation concerned with
local problems involving the location of highways) alleged that
the Bureau's decision had been "arbitrary and capricious" and
sought review by the court as "aggrieved parties" under the
authority of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They argued
that defendant had not followed the mandate of the Federal
Highway Act to "use maximum effort to preserve Federal, State and
local government parklands and historical sites and the beauty
and historical value of such lands and sites". Defendants
contended that the action should be dismissed on the grounds that
plaintiffs lacked proper standing. However, the court ruled that
the Federal Highway Act manifested a "congressional intent that
towns, local civic organisations, and conservation groups are to
be considered ~aggrieved' by agency action which allegedly has
disregarded their interests".
In the second case, plaintiffs sought to challenge a ruling by
the United States Comptroller of the Currency under the authority
of the National Bank, but were held to lack proper standing by
the lower courts on the grounds that they were not members of the
class which the Act was designed to protect and had not alleged
any actual or potential harm to a legally recognised interest.
The Court reversed the decision of the lower court holding that
the requisites for standing are met when ~the interests sought
1 7 8
17 9
270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
397 US 150 (1970).
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to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question I . 180
Turning now to the criteria which must be met by private
plaintiffs who seek standing to challenge federal administrative
action as contrary to the public interest, the case of Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v Federal
Communi ca tions Cotumi eei.orr'" clarified the matter. Plaintiffs,
a national religious organisation, a local church, and two more
black community leaders, sought to intervene on their own behalf
and as representatives of the "listener interest" in a Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) hearing concerning the renewal
of broadcast license of a Jackson, Mississippi, television
Station. Plaintiffs desired to present to the FCC allegations
that the station had engaged in racially and religiously
discriminatory practices. The Commission contended that members
of the viewing public as such are not in a position to suffer any
injury unique or personal to themselves and the plaintiffs had
thus presented no recognized basis for standing to challenge the
agency I s actions. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, however, disagreed, concluding that "since the
concept of standing is a practical and functional one designed
to insure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest
can participate in a proceeding, we can see no reason to exclude
those with such an obvious and acute concern as the listening
audience". However, the Court was quick to rule that not all
petitioners possessed the requisite standing. It ruled that the
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359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
359 F.2d at 1002.
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Some developments in the field of standing have so far been
a chieved in the United States federal law since the early 70's.
The US congress created the models for citizen enforcement of
environmental protection in passing the US federal law (Clean Air
Act (CAA) of 1970 the Federal Water Pollution Act (FWPCA) of
1972) and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970. Today
many environmental statutes include similar citizen suit
provisions which allow citizens to obtain injunctive relief,
requiring either a government agency to perform a mandatory duty
according to the statute, or requiri ng a private defendant to
comply with regulatory or permit limits, or an administrative
order, and possibly, to remedy any harm caused to the
errv.i r'onrnerrt c l'" Generally, the courts have become more willing
to recognize a minimal personal interest as sufficient to found
standing in environmental matters .184
The case of Lujan v National Wildlife Federatiod 85 is a good
example of the recent cases which were brought by organisations
alleging interests on the part of their members. The case arose
under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) , which provides
that, (1) the purpose of the Act is the conservation of plants
and animals threatened with extinction by the act ivities of human
beings i (2) that a federal agency intending to take action
affecting an endangered species must "consult" with the Secretary
of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce before taking any
action affecting a species on the Endangered Species List
(prepared by the Secretary of the Interior as required by the
Act) i and (3) that "any person" may sue to enjoin "any person",
1 8 3 See generally Robbins 'Public interest environmental
litigation in the United States' in Public interest perspectives
in environmental law by Robinson and Dunkely at 3-36.
1 84 See United States v Students Challenging Agency
Procedures (SCRAP) (412 US 669 1973) I where the United States
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had standing even though
the students who brought the a ction would not be more affected
than any other member of the population.
1 85 110 S Ct 3177 (1990).
84
including the US, from violating any provision of the Act or
regulation thereafter. Its key provision provides that "Eaeh
Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency is not
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species.
In 1978, the Secretary of the interior promulgated a rule that
the ESA applies to federal agency action to be taken overseas.
More than half the species on the Endangered Species List have
primary ranges outside the US. In 1986, the Secretary replaced
this rule with one limiting the scope of ESA to actions taken in
US territory or on the high seas. In short, the regulation
limited the duty of federal agencies to consult with the
Secretary over projects affecting endangered species. Under the
regulation, agencies must consult over projects in the United
States or on the high seas, but not over projects overseas such
as the Aswan Dam in Egypt.
Several environmental organisations, including Defenders of
Wildlife, challenged the legality of a Department of Interior
regulation issued under the Endangered Species Act, claiming that
the new regulation violated the statute. To establish standing,
two members of the Defenders of Wildlife claimed that they
suffered an injury in fact. Joyce Kelly swore in an affidavit
that she had travelled to Egypt in 1986 and viewed the habitat
of the endangered Nile crocodile. She claimed that she lIintended
to do so again, and hoped to observe the crocodile d.i r-ect.Lyv . Amy
Skilbred claimed that she had travelled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and
observed the habitat of lIendangered species such as the Asian
elephant and the leopard ll • She also claimed that she intended to
return to Sri Lanka to see members of these species. However, she
acknowledged that she did not have a certain date for return.
The Court, through Justice Scalia, speaking for the majority,
held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that they suffered
I
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the requisite injury in fact. Further, the intention to visit the
places harbouring endangered species was not enough. The
plaintiffs had set out no particular plans. Moreover, they
specified no time when their indefinite plans would materialize
and thus had shown no "actual or imminent 11 injury. Plaintiffs
could not show injuries in fact by demonstrating a nexus linking
their own "professional" interests in observing endangered
species with the interests of all persons so engaged. The fact
that ecosystems are generally interrelated was not enough,
because the plaintiffs could not show that they used portions of
an ecosystem "perceptibly affected by the unlawful action in
question". Standing was similarly not available to anyone having
an interest in studying or seeing endangered species, because of
a professional commitment or otherwise. To establish standing
there must be "a factual showing of perceptible harm".
The Court emphasized that 11 [v] indicating the public interest
(including the public interest in government observance of the
Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief
Executive". In particular, the Court said that if Congress could
t u r n 11 the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers I
compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in
the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional
duty, that is to take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed 11 . 1 8 6
In what clearly appeared to be an intriguing and somewhat
ambiguous concurring opinion Justice Kennedy joined by Justice
Souter, emphasised that, had the plaintiffs purchased an airplane
ticket, set a specific date to visit the habitat of the
endangered species mentioned, or used the relevant sites on a
regular basis, they might have established standing in a case of
this kind. In any case, the court reaffirmed i ts position that
1 8 6 112 S. Ct. at 2145. (Discussed by R Sustein in 'Wha t' s
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article
III' Michigan Law Review vol. 91:163 at 197-202.
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"while it does not matter how many persons have been injured by
the challenged action, the party bringing suit must show that the
action injures him in a concrete and personal way".
The US Supreme Court has held, in a line of cases, including
Sierra Club v Morton and Lujan II that, in effect, concern for
the environment, or even for a specific resource that is being
depleted or contaminated, is not a sufficient "injury" to confer
standing. It lS not enough, in the Court's view, that the
plaintiffs simply wish to know that the resource will not be
harmed, or that the resource will "be t.he r e " should they ever
wish to visit or use it; they must allege and prove that they
actually use, or plan to use soon, the resource. In addition to
demonstrating a "place" concreteness (that is, that the plaintiff
is geographically near the threatened resource), the plaintiff
must demonstrate "time" concreteness or 'I imminence" in his
planned use. Therefore, plaintiffs must do more than merely
allege injury in fact and they must present oral or written
testimony (by way of affidavit) presenting concrete facts that
the witness or affiant is "directly affected" . 1 8 7
In my view, in order to broaden the scope of public interest
litigation substantially, South Africa can learn from the United
States federal courts that have read public environmental rights
into statutes because of a tacit acknowledgement of a fundamental
public right to a decent environment underlying the statutes.
Therefore, our environmental statutes could be construed in such
a way that would give standing to groups or parties interested
in the protection and conservation of the environment where a
threat to the environment is evident. I am convinced that the
adoption of this particular kind of approach in South Africa
would further broaden access to environmental justice far beyond
1 87 See 'Public Interest Environmental Litigation in the
United States' by Deirdre H Robbins in 'Public Interest
Perspectives in Environmental Law' supra at 14-15.
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what section 38 of the New Constitution envisages . 1 8 8
There is no material difference between the Indian and the United
States' legal systems in terms of their approach to standing
since both of them evince a flexible approach to standing.
Switzerland is another country whose approach to standing is
flexible.
5.3 Switzerland
Switzerland is one of the best-known European countries which has
made way for public interest actions by environmental
associations and/or concerned individuals. It was the first
European Country to establish a right of action for environmental
associations. A number of acts have been passed to enable
nationwide associations to have standing to challenge certain
administrative actions.
Article 12 of the Federal Nature and Heritage Conservation Act
(NHCA 1966) was the first enactment which enables nationwide
associations which, according to their statutes, devote
themselves to nature and heritage conservation or related, purely
non-commercial objectives, as well as municipalities, to appeal
against certain administrative decisions. The Act allows those
associations to lodge an administrative appeal to the federal
government or judicial appeal to the Supreme Court against orders
and decrees in so far as these are subject to federal
appeals. 1 8 9
The second enactment is Article 55 of the Environmental
Protection Act 1983 which grants the same rights of appeal and
1 8 8 The New Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act
108 of 1996.
1 8 9 . Martin Fuhr et al in 'Public Interest Perspectives in
Environmental Law' by Robinson and Duckeley supra at 79-80.
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remedies at the cantonal level to nationwide environmental
associations founded at least 10 years before the initiation of
proceedings and officially recognised by the federal government.
The law allows locus standi also to municipalities. The third
enactment to permit lawsuits at the federal level is the Trails
and Footpaths Act 1987, which has likewise opted for an
accreditation procedure for national, specialist organisations
administered by the Swiss Department of Interior. 1 90
The recent studies conducted on the subject have emphasised the
positive effect of association lawsuits on environmental
protection ln Switzerland. Generally, the appeals by
environmental associations have the effect of suspending the
execution of the contested administrative decisions. However the
main object of such lawsuits is the annulment or alteration of
decisions contravening environmental law. Unfortunately, as the
law stands in Switzerland at present there is no cause of action
to recover environmental damages. 191 Generally, the law of
Switzerland in the area of standing to sue is as good as ours.
However, the reluctance of the Government of Switzerland to allow
a cause of action to recover environmental damage is one kind of
approach that does not have a place in South Africa.
Besides the relaxation of the standing requirements in the
countries discussed above there are quite a few other countries
whose approach to standing is quite broad. A brief exposition of
those countries will follow in the next discussion below. The
common factor that one can easily identify from these countries
is the courts I willingness to accord standing to concerned
individuals, citizens and groups of persons whenever damage or
threatened damage to the environment is evident. Recent
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5.4 Other countries
A similar relaxation of the standing requirement in environmental
matters has taken place in many other countries both inside and
outside Europe. In Canada, environmental groups and individuals
are accepted as plaintiffs or 11intervenors 11 in the administrative
tribunals. The 1980s have seen courts liberalizing their rules
of standing to some extent. This achievement could be attributed
to the enactment of the IICharter of Rights and Freedoms ll • The
Canadian Supreme Court now acknowledges a IIgenuine interest l' of
the plaintiff and accords "pubLd.c interest s t.and i nq " to concerned
citizens or groups of persons, if there is no other reasonable
and effective way to bring the matter before a court . 1 9 3
The new Brazilian Constitution of 1988 expressly provides for an
actio popularis against acts of public authorities which are
harmful to national wealth, administrative morality or the
environment, including the cultural heritage. In addition, a
statute of 1985 also allows environmental associations with legal
personality to bring a IIpublic civil action ll in order to stop
environmentally harmful activi ties or claim compensation. 1 94
In Norway, the requirement of Illegal interest ll under section 28
of the Administration Act and section 54 of the (civil) Procedure
Act does not exclude actions by groups such as the Norwegian
Nature Conservation Association claiming to represent the
1 92 See Wildlife Society of South Africa and Others v
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of the Republic of
South Africa and Others [1996] 3 All SA at 463f and Van Huysteen
and Others v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism
and Others 1996 (1) SA 208 (C).
1 9 3
194




interests of its members, even though such actions seem to be
rare. In Poland, before the establishment of democracy in 1989
the legislation of the communist era gave certain officially
licensed "social organisations 11 such as environmental
associations and neighbourhood committees, the right to lodge
administrative appeals and initiate proceedings in
administrative , civil and criminal courts. However, the communist
legislation was proved to be ineffective. 195
The law of the Netherlands as it now stands provides that
environmental organisations, as an exception to the rule, need
not satisfy any requirements additional to the formulation of
their obj ect and purpose in order to be able to obtain an
injunction whenever the interests they seek to protect are harmed
or threatened by harm. This position was formulated in a landmark
decision of De Niewe Meer96 where the Netherlands Supreme Court
held that the general interest of environmental protection as
such is encompassed by the protective scope of the Civil Code's
delict law provision and that organisations whose object and
purpose are environmental protection are entitled to seek
injunctions in delict relating to harmful effects to the
interests they are promoting on the basis of that description of
the purpose alone.
After analysing the law of standing in other parts of the world
to this extent I have come to the conclusion that South Africa
has got much in common with most of the countries that I have
just surveyed in the area of standing. The only noticeable
exceptions are those few countries that still c l i ng to the
orthodox approach that requires plaintiffs to prove that their
subjective rights have been violated in order to be accorded
standing to sue. I strongly feel that there is much we can learn
from those foreign countries whose legal systems evince a broader
1 95 Ibid.
1 96 Decided by the Netherlands Supreme Court on June 27,
1986 and reported in the Netherlandse Jurisprudentie (19 87 ) .




The signing of the New Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Act No. 108, 1996 by the State President on the lOth
December 1996 signalled victory to the many citizens groups which
increasingly claim guardianship over the public interest in a
decent environment. The threshold issue in citizen actions for
the protection of environmental values is standing to sue. After
so many years of uncertainties in the environmental sphere
regarding the claimant I s competence to vindicate the public
interest there seems to be some light at the end of the tunnel.
The Constitution has finally crushed the traditional barriers to
standing by entrenching an environmental right as well as the
enforcement of right clauses. It also gives citizen groups and
individuals standing to protect the environment in the public
interest. However, access to environmental justice requires not
only legislative rights to go to court, but also the resources,
both institutional and financial.
I must also point out that not only does the constitution open
up access to environmental justice or entrench a justiciable
environmental right, it also gives its custodians new
responsibilities viz, the prevention of pollution and ecological
degradation; promotion of conservation and the securing of
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources
while promoting justifiable economic and social development.
Above all the challenge is upon all citizens to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment for the
benefit of present and future generations.
In my view, the Constitution has finally broadened the locus
standi requirement quite substantially. So far very few
environmental cases have come up before the Constitutional Court
which brings me to the conclusion that it is too early to judge
the success of the Courts in that respect. However, in these




In particular, the Court in Ferreira v Levin No and Others1 9 8
held that a broad approach to locus standi should be adopted. In
this case the Court remarked that section 7(4) (b) demonstrates
that a broader and not a narrow approach to locus standi is
required. Most importantly the Court held that the
constitutionality of a law may be challenged on the basis that
it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution other
than those contained in Chapter 3. In my view, the Ferreira
decision should be welcome for its flexibility when it comes to
the law of standing.
It is submitted in conclusion that the scope of locus standi in
our constitution is broad enough as evidenced by the s~ccess of
the few recent cases that came to the Constitutional Court. It
is now left to our courts (and the Constitutional Court in
particular) to develop more authoritative c a s e s t ha t will further
open up access to environmental justice. The level of
environmental consciousness in South Africa has increased quite
substantially. As a result, an increase in the level of
environmental litigation is also evident.
1 9 7 These cases include Van Huysteen and o t h e r s NNO v
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 1966(1)
SA 283; Wildlife Society of South Africa and Others v Minister
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism of the Republic of South
Africa and Others [1996] 3 All SA; and Ferreira v Levin NO and
Others and Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1)
BCLR 1 (CC).
1 9 8 . 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).
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7. CONCLUSION
To sum up, one must applaud the many positive elements
incorporated in the New Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Act No.10B, 1996. In view of the deliberate effort by the
drafters to incorporate public participation our courts must take
the initiative in recognising the public law status of applicants
requiring locus standi in the area of environment. I have no
doubts whatsoever that the new Constitution, coupled with
creative and realistic interpretation by our courts, will pave
the way for a more liberalised view on locus standi in
environmental affairs in South Africa.
The challenge that faces lawyers, ecologists and
environmentalists is to start laying judicial "bricks" on the
foundation laid down by the drafters of the constitution. Their
task is to fashion an acceptable environment for all the present
and future generations. Of importance is to note that public
interest litigation will develop a body of case law which would
indicate areas of concern in the constitution and define the
legal issues involved. The Constitutional Court, in particular,
will be faced with the most important task of developing case law
that will fashion our environmental law as we move towards the
21st century.
Now that the constitution has finally broadened the concept of
locus standi significantly, our courts, in general, are left with
an obligation to open their doors to environmental organisations
seeking to protect the environment for the benefit of present and
future generations. Efficient procedures through which open and
transparent environmental decisions could be taken should also
be developed. Above all, the concept of locus standi should be
expanded even further thereby making our courts more accessible.
Now the main consideration is how litigation could be used
strategically as a means of promoting and protecting
environmental rights.
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In conclusion I would suggest that standing rules should simply
be done away with so that a litigant need only show that s/he has
an arguable case on the law. This might appear to be another way
to open up floodgates of cases coming to the courts but the
reality is that we need to make way for people with deserving
cases to appear before the courts without going through the
hurdles of proving standing. I am not convinced that .s t a nd i ng
rules serve any real purpose in environmental litigation because
what we are concerned with is the protection of the environment,
the s~condary concern being the conservation of our natural
resources for the present and future generations. Lastly,
increasing interest representation in environmental law points
to the need for broad locus standi as discussed above. Our
Constitution stipulates that citizens and citizens groups should
have standing to vindicate the public interest. I, therefore, do
not see any reason why standing should be restricted in anyway.
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